

# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정






# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정

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전쟁사와 국방정책 2024-II

## 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정



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## 발간사

국방부 군사편찬연구소  
소장 오성대


한미동맹 70주년을 기념하기 위해 2023년 12월 국방부 군사편찬연구소는 한미동맹의 과거를 성찰하고 미래를 조망하는 공간사(公刊史)인 『한미동맹 70년사』를 발간하였습니다. 이번에 발간하게 된 『미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정』은 『한미동맹 70년사』에서 상세히 다루지 못한 한미동맹 성립과정에 관한 미국 외교 사료 해제를 통하여 객관적 시각에서 한미동맹 역사에 대한 이해를 도모하고자 하였습니다.

미국 국무부 사료인 FRUS(Foreign Relations of the United States), 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV에는 한미 양국 대통령과 관계관들이 자국의 이익을 추구하고면서 한반도 평화·안정을 모색하려고 대립과 협력을 반복했던 한미동맹 성립과정의 흔적이 실려 있습니다. 한국군 단독 북진(北進)통일을 주창했던 이승만 대통령과 유엔의 한반도 정전(停戰) 원칙을 고수했던 아이젠하워 미국 대통령의 대립은 그 절정이라 할 수 있습니다.



미국의 필요로 인해 체결된 다른 양자 동맹들과는 달리 한국 측 요청으로 어렵게 성립된 한미동맹은 그 어느 동맹보다도 긴 70년 역사를 가지고 있습니다. 이 책을 읽는 한미동맹 분야 정책입안자들이 70년 전 선각자들의 흔적을 통해 관련 분야 정책 수립과 추진을 위한 통찰력을 얻게 되길 기대합니다.

2024년 4월 30일




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# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정



## I. 개 요





전쟁사와 국방정책 2024-II

# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정

## I. 개 요

2023년 12월 한미동맹 70주년 기념사업으로 국방부 군사편찬연구소는 『한미동맹 70년사(1953-2023)』를 발간하였다. 『한미동맹 70년사』에서 세 부적으로 다루지 못한 한미동맹 성립 초기, 즉 「한미상호방위조약」 체결과 발효에 관한 역사적 맥락을 독자들에게 구체적으로 소개하기 위한 목적으로 이 책을 집필하였다.

한미동맹의 근간이 되는 「한미상호방위조약」은 1953년 10월 1일 미국 워싱턴에서 변영태 외무장관과 덜레스(John Foster Dulles) 미 국무장관이 공식적으로 조인하였다.<sup>1)</sup> 1954년 1월 15일 대한민국 국회, 1월 26일 미국 상원에서 「한미상호방위조약」을 비준하였으나, 양국 의회의 비준과 동시에 법적 효력을 발휘하지 못하고 같은 해 11월 18일 비준서 교환 이후에 정식으로 발효되었다.<sup>2)</sup>

「한미상호방위조약」의 체결 이후에도 중요한 현안에 대한 양국 정상회의 이견 조율이 필요했기 때문이다.<sup>3)</sup> 이승만 대통령과 미국 아이젠하워(Dwight D. Eisenhower) 대통령 사이의 긴장과 갈등, 그리고 상호 합의에 도달하여 「한미합의의사록」을 체결하고 「한미상호방위조약」이 정식 발효되기까지의 과정이 양국 대통령 기록물 등 외교 사료에 담겨있다.<sup>4)</sup>

1) 「한미상호방위조약」의 공식 명칭은 「대한민국과 미합중국 간의 상호방위조약(Mutual Defense Treaty between the Republic of Korea and the United States of America)」이다.

2) 「한미상호방위조약」 제5조에 “본 조약은 대한민국과 미합중국에 의하여 각자의 헌법상의 수속(手續)에 따라 비준되어야 하며, 그 비준서가 양국에 의하여 워싱턴에서 교환되었을 때 효력을 발생한다.”라고 명시되어 있다.

3) 미국은 휴전(休戰, 停戰, armistice)을 전쟁의 종식으로 간주했지만, 이승만 대통령은 휴전을 전쟁 행위의 일시적인 중단으로 인식하였다. 이 대통령은 휴전 후에도 북진통일을 추창하면서 한미군사동맹 체제의 강화를 위해 노력하였다. 그는 「한미상호방위조약」만으로는 공산주의 침략으로부터 한국의 안전을 보장하기에 부족하다고 판단하였기에 국군의 대폭적인 전력 강화와 현대화, 미국 경제 원조의 일본 전용(轉用) 방지를 미국 정부에 요구하였다. Memorandum, President Syngman Rhee to All diplomatic officials, 14 August 1953, Rhee Papers; <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/memorandum-president-syngman-rhee-all-diplomatic-officials>.

4) 「한미합의의사록」의 공식 명칭은 「한국에 대한 군사 및 경제 원조에 관한 대한민국과 미

주요 내용은 다음과 같다.

1953년 10월 21일 이승만 대통령은 유엔군 사령관 헐(John E. Hull)에게 제네바 정치회담은 실패로 끝날 것이고, 자신은 한반도 분단상태를 용납하지 않을 것이며, 압록강까지 진격하여 무력으로 통일할 것이라고 언급하였다.<sup>5)</sup> 1953년 11월 4일 아이젠하워 대통령은 이승만 대통령에게 한국이 단독으로 북진할 경우 참담한 패배를 면치 못할 것이며, 「한미상호방위조약」의 조속한 비준과 한국에 대한 군사·경제 원조 법안의 순조로운 의회 통과를 위해 군사적 단독행동을 하지 않겠다고 서약하라는 내용의 서한을 보냈다.<sup>6)</sup>

1954년 3월 11일 이승만 대통령은 아이젠하워 대통령에게 대한민국과 그 동맹국 보호를 위한 대안으로 적의 기습 공격을 예방하기 위하여 대한민국 육군 20개 사단에 대한 미국 해군·공군과 군수 지원, 대한민국 육군을 35~40개 사단으로 증강, 한국 지상군에 대한 밴 플리트(James Van Fleet) 장군의 훈련 과업 부여 등을 제안하였다.<sup>7)</sup> 1954년 3월 22일 이승만 대통령이 제안한 대안은 거절하고 대한민국에 동원 예비군을 만드는 것 제안한다는 미국 측의 답변이 이 대통령에게 전달되었다.<sup>8)</sup>

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합중국 간의 합의의사록(Agreed Minutes and Amendment Thereto between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America relating to Continued Cooperation in Economic and Military Matters and Amendment to the Agreed Minute of November 17, 1954)이다. 1954년 11월 17일 서울에서 서명하고 발효된 「한미합의의사록」은 1955년 8월 12일 워싱턴에서 수정되어 발효되었다.

- 5) Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, October 21, 1953, [Attachment] The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, October 21, 1953-4:20 p.m, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.
- 6) The Secretary of State to the Vice President, Washington, November 4, 1953, [Enclosure] President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee), Washington, November 4, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.
- 7) Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Radford) to the Secretary of State, Washington, 17 March 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.
- 8) Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council, Washington, March 26, 1954, Appendix B, Further

1954년 7월 27일 한미정상회담 제1차 회의 시 이승만 대통령이 북진 통일의 필요성을 역설하자, 아이젠하워 대통령은 그런 전쟁에 미국이 개입하는 일은 절대 없을 것이라고 강조하였다.<sup>9)</sup> 7월 28일 저녁, 미 국무부 동북아국장 영(Kenneth T. Young)은 한국 대표단에 「워싱턴에서 개최된 한미 양국 대통령과 그 조연자들 사이에서 이루어진 협의에 입각한 한미합의의사록」이라는 문서를 제출하였다. 이승만 대통령은 “미국은 모든 평화적 방법으로 한국의 통일을 지지한다.”라고 적시한 문구를 보자 분개하였다. 자신이 동의해 준 적도 없을 뿐만 아니라 한국의 생존 가능성이 담보되지 않는 어떠한 협정에도 서명할 수 없다는 것이었다. 7월 29일 미 국무장관 덜레스는 한국군 해군과 공군의 전투력 강화에 반대하였다. 그는 한국은 일본에 적대적이므로 증강된 전투함대를 동해에서 조업하는 일본 어선을 축출하는 데 이용할 것이며, 증강된 제트전투기들은 압록강 북방으로 폭탄을 투하하는 데 이용될지도 모른다는 강한 우려를 표명하였다. 나아가 덜레스는 한국과 일본 간의 어업권 분쟁이 해결되기 전에는 한국군의 증강을 강행하지 말 것을 제안하였다.<sup>10)</sup>

1954년 7월 29일 제3차 정상회담에서 이승만 대통령은 미국이 한국 통일을 위한 군사적 방법을 진지하게 고려한다면, 통일을 달성할 수 있는 복안을 밝히겠다고 제안하였다. 이에 대해 그 복안이 무엇인지 짐작하고 있던 아이젠하워 대통령은 이 대통령이 한국군을 공격 목적으로는 이용하지 않을 것을 확신한다고 대응하였다.<sup>11)</sup> 1954년 7월 30일 미 국무부는 미국 측 공동성명 초안을 이승만 대통령에게 제시하였다. 사전 협의 없이 작성된 미국 측 초안의 “한국은 일본과의 관계에 있어서 우호적이고”라는 문구를 본 이 대통령은 분노하였다. 한일 국교 정상화 문제에 대한 한미 두 정상의 현저한 시각 차이가 드러났다. 이 대통령은 “일

Exchange of Letters Between President Eisenhower and President Rhee(NSC 170/1), Washington, March 23, 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

9) Hagerty Diary, 27 July 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

10) Memorandum of Discussion at the 208th Meeting of the NSC, 29 July 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

11) US Summary Minutes of the Third Meeting of US-Korea Talks(29 July 1954), 2 August 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

본의 한국 지배는 한국에 유익하였다.”라는 일본 측 한일회담 대표 구보 다(久保田貫一郎)의 망언을 상기시키면서 “그런 일본과 어떻게 국교를 정상화할 수 있겠냐?”라고 반문하였다. 아이젠하워 대통령이 “과거 일이 어떻든 한일 국교 정상화는 꼭 필요하다.”라는 점을 강조하자, 이 대통령은 “내가 있는 한 일본과는 상종하지 않겠다.”라고 단호하게 반박하였다. 제4차 정상회담에서 논의된 또 다른 의제는 「한미합의의사록」 작성이었다. 회담 전날인 7월 29일 한국 대표단은 미국 측의 초안을 받았다. 7월 30일 회담에서는 한국의 요구로 미국 측 초안의 내용이 많이 수정되었고, 회담이 끝날 무렵에 원칙적 합의가 이루어졌지만, 이 대통령은 7월 31일 귀국할 때까지 서명을 거부하였다.<sup>12)</sup>

1954년 9월 10일 미국은 이승만 대통령의 단독 군사행동을 사전에 저지하기 위해 유엔군 사령관 헐(John E. Hull)과 주한미군 제8군 사령관 테일러(Maxwell D. Taylor)를 통해서 한국군의 고위 장성들에게 한국의 전쟁 재개는 미국의 지지를 받지 못할 것이라는 점을 전달하였다.<sup>13)</sup> 1954년 9월 27일 이승만 대통령은 주한 미국대사 브릭스(Ellis Ormsbee Briggs), 유엔군 사령관 헐과 회동을 하였다. 이승만 대통령은 평화적인 방법으로 한국 통일을 달성하겠다는 미국의 정책은 실패했으며, 공산주의 세력의 위협에 대한 충분한 검토와 적절한 대책 마련도 없이 이루어진 미군의 재배치계획을 비판하면서, 한국은 미국의 지원 여부와 관계없이 진로를 결정할 수밖에 없다고 역설하였다. 브릭스와 헐이 한국은 자체 방위와 공산주의 세력의 위협에 충분히 대처할 수 있는 군사력을 보유하고 있다는 점을 강조했지만, 이 대통령은 동의하지 않았다. 이 대통령은 한국에 대한 미국의 경제·군사 원조 기금 사용 문제는 한국 정부가 자체적으로 판단해서 사용할 수 있어야 한다고 주장하였다. 한일회담 재개를 위한 미국의 중재자 임명 문제와 관련해서, 이 대통령은 일본의 배신과 일본이 다시 한국을 지배하려는 야욕을 설명하였다.

12) US Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of US-Korea Talks(30 July 1954), *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

13) Memorandum by the Commander in Chief, Far East (Hull) to the Secretary of State, 10 September 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.



이어서 그는 미국 측이 제시한 「한미합의의사록」 최종안을 조금 더 검토 하겠다고 말하였다.<sup>14)</sup>

1954년 10월 22일 이승만 대통령은 브릭스 대사에게 「한미합의의사록」 최종안을 파기시킬 수도 있는 내용이 담긴 외교 각서 형식의 재수정안을 제시하였다. 이 재수정안에는 다음의 내용이 포함되어 있었다. 한국 방위를 위해 15개 전투사단 신설에 동의할 것, 10~15개 전투사단 증설에 협조한다면 한국군 작전지휘권이 유엔군사령부에 귀속되는 것을 동의하겠음, 일본 상품·자재의 한국 내 밀수입을 사전 차단하는 데 미국이 적극적으로 협조할 것, 일본이 한국을 침략할 경우 미국은 한국 독립을 보장할 것, 미국은 한국과 함께 필요한 모든 방법으로 한국 통일을 위해 노력할 것 등이다.<sup>15)</sup> 1954년 10월 26일 델레스 미 국무장관은 브릭스 대사에게, 미국은 무력에 의한 한국 통일을 지지할 수 없으므로 한국 정부는 재수정안을 철회하고, 미국이 제시한 「한미합의의사록」 최종안에 동의하라는 내용의 서한을 써서 이승만 대통령에게 직접 전달하라고 지시하였다.<sup>16)</sup>

1954년 11월 12일 델레스 국무장관은 브릭스 대사에게 이승만 대통령이 재수정안을 끝까지 고집한다면 미국 의회의 승인을 받아야만 하는, 대한(對韓) 경제·군사 원조의 집행이 불가능하게 될 것이라는 점을 확실히 상기시키라고 지시하였다. 동시에 델레스 장관은 한국 정부가 한국 측 통일방안에 관한 미국의 입장이 실린 별개의 각서를 수용한다면, 평화적 방법으로 한국 측 통일방안을 지지한다는 기존의 미국 측 초안 내용을 삭제할 수도 있다는 점을 이승만 대통령에게 제의하라고 브릭스 대사에게 지시하였다.<sup>17)</sup>

한미 양국은 상기한 바와 같은 1년여 기간의 협상 과정을 거쳐 1954

14) The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs) to the Department of State, 27 September 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

15) The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs) to the Department of State, 22 October 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

16) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, 26 October 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

17) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, 12 November 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

년 11월 17일 오후 4시 이승만 대통령이 입회한 가운데 변영태 외무장관과 브릭스 주한미국대사가 「한국에 대한 군사 및 경제 원조에 관한 대한민국과 미합중국 간의 합의의사록」과 그 부록에 공식 조인하였다. 이어서 워싱턴 현지시각 11월 17일 오후 2시(한국 11월 18일 오전 4시)에 양측 대표가 「한미상호방위조약」을 승인한 한미 국회의 비준서를 교환함으로써 조약의 법적 효력이 발생하였다.

「한미합의의사록」에는 한국의 통일방안 관련 구체적 조항이 없다. 그러나 아이젠하워 정부는 모든 평화적인 방법으로 한국 통일방안을 지지하는 것이 미국의 변함없는 정책이라는 내용이 담긴 별개의 각서를 한국에 전달했고, 한국도 이러한 미국의 입장을 확인한다는 각서를 미국에 전달하였다.<sup>18)</sup> 이로써 이승만 대통령은 자신의 북진통일 주장을 포기하는 대가로, 국군 10개 예비 사단 신설과 해·공군력 증강을 포함한 미국 군사·경제 원조를 확대하는 성과를 거두었다. 「한미합의의사록」 조인으로 한국은 육군 66만 1,000명, 해군 1만 5,000명, 해병대 2만 7,500명, 공군 1만 6,500명으로 구성된 총 72만 명의 국군을 유지하게 되었다.<sup>19)</sup> 이승만 대통령은 국가의 생존을 확보할 수 있는 군사적 안보가 정치적 민주주의와 경제적 발전보다 우선해야 한다고 믿었다. 「한미상호방위조약」과 「한미합의의사록」의 체결로 성립된 한미동맹으로, 이승만 대통령은 한국의 생존과 안보를 미국으로부터 보장받는 데 성공하였다. 한편 아이젠하워 행정부는 이승만 대통령의 단독 군사행동으로 인한 전쟁에 미국이 연루될 위험성을 감소시켰다는 점에서 성과를 거두었다.

이 책은 이승만 대통령의 공과에 대한 논쟁을 피하고 역사적 사실의 객관성을 담보하려고 대한민국 대통령 기록물은 다루지 않았다. 미국 국무부(Department of State) 역사실(Office of the Historian)의 인터넷


18) The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command(Hull), Washington, September 15, 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.

19) The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command(Hull), Washington, September 15, 1954, [Appendix B] Republic of Korea Force Levels for Fiscal Year 1955 and United States Support Thereof, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.

공개 사료인 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV*의 관련 문서를 소개하고 이해를 돕기 위한 해제(解題)를 붙였다. 이 책에 실린 사료에는 미국에서 1급 비밀(Top Secret)로 취급하다가 비밀등급이 해제(解除)된 문서를 포함하여 흥미로운 기록이 많다.<sup>20)</sup> 전쟁 직후 세계 최빈국이었던 나라의 대통령이 초강대국인 미국 대통령과 그 관료들과의 협상을 주도적으로 이끌었던 사례도 소개되어 있다.<sup>21)</sup> 국방 분야의 한미동맹 관련 연구자와 정책입안자들이 이 책을 읽고 연구와 정책 수립을 위한 통찰력을 얻게 되길 기대한다.



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- 20) 1급 비밀 해제된 문서의 예를 들면 「에버레디계획(Outline Plan Ever Ready)」이다. 1953년 5월 4일 주한미군 제8군사령관 테일러(Maxwell Taylor) 중장은 휴전협정을 반대하고 북진통일을 주창하는 이승만 대통령을 축출하기 위한 「에버레디계획」을 수립 하였다. Paper submitted by the Commanding General of the United States Eight Army(Taylor), Seoul, 4 May 1953, *Foreign Relations of the United States(이하 FRUS로 약칭), 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 1*.
- 21) 일례를 들면 이승만 대통령은 자신의 주장이 관철될 때까지 「한미합의의사록」에 서명하지 않았다. United States Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of United States Republic of Korea Talks, July 30, 1954, 3 p.m. Washington, [undated] *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



전쟁사와 국방정책 2024-Ⅱ

# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정



## II. 한미상호방위조약 가조인과 조인





## II. 한미상호방위조약 가조인과 조인

6·25전쟁 정전협상 과정에서 북진통일과 안보조약의 필요성을 주창한 이승만 대통령은 정전 반대를 「한미상호방위조약」 체결을 위한 협상 지렛대로 사용하고, 미국은 정전회담 진행에 걸림돌인 이승만 정부를 통제하려는 「에버레디계획」을 수립하였다. 이러한 과정을 통해 1953년 7월 27일 「정전협정」이 체결되고, 한미 양국은 같은 해 8월 8일 「한미상호방위조약」을 가조인(假調印)한 후, 10월 1일 정식으로 조인하였다.

그 주요 과정은 다음과 같다. 1952년 3월 21일 이승만 대통령은 트루먼 대통령에게 정전협상을 비판하면서 상호안보협정이 뒷받침되면 한국 국민에게 정전을 받아들이라고 설득할 수 있다는 서한을 보냈다. 같은 해 7월 5일 유엔군 사령관 클라크는 개입이 필요할 경우를 대비하여 이승만 대통령의 저항을 제한하기 위한 계획을 수립하였다고 미국 합참의장에게 보고하였다. 1953년 4월 8일 미 국무부 극동차관보 존슨은 미국 국무장관에게 한국은 현 전선에서의 정전을 반대하고 미국과 양자 방위조약을 요구한다는 내용의 각서를 보냈다. 이 각서에 “이승만 대통령은 미국이 결정한 정전을 반대하는 것이 불가능함을 잘 알면서도 미국으로부터 상호방위조약 체결을 얻어내기 위한 하나의 수단으로 정전 반대를 사용하려고 한다.”라고 기록되어 있다. 같은 해 5월 4일 주한미군 제8군 사령관은 한국군 작전통제권이 약화·상실될 경우, 제8군이 「정전협정」에 관한 유엔의 입장이 유지되도록 행동할 수 있는 「에버레디계획 초안」을 제출하였다. 1953년 5월 30일 이승만 대통령은 자신에게 「정전협정」을 받아들이라고 하는 말은 한국민에게 저항하지 말고 사형선고를 받아들인다는 말과 같다는 서한을 아이젠하워 대통령에게 보냈다. 6월 8일 유엔군 사령관 클라크는 한국 정부의 독자적 행동 가능성에 대비하기 위한 「에버레디계획 개정안」을 미국 합참의장에게 전송하였다. 7월 9일 이승만 대통령은 미 국무부 극동차관보 로버트슨에게 한국 측 「한미상호방위조약」 초안을 동봉한 서한을 발송하였다.

The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to President Truman, Pusan, March 21, 1952  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*, 795B.11/3-2752

미국이 주도하는 유엔군이 6·25전쟁 휴전을 추진하자 이승만 대통령은 미국에 한미상호방위조약의 필요성을 먼저 제안하였다. 다음은 이 대통령이 미국 대통령에게 보낸 서한에 관한 내용이다. 1952년 3월 21일 부산에서 이승만 대통령은 트루먼 대통령에게 「한미상호방위조약」 체결의 필요성과 한국군 증강 프로그램의 신속한 추진을 요청하는 서한을 발송하였다.<sup>22)</sup>

이승만 대통령은 “휴전회담으로 공산주의자들의 증강은 허용되고 자유민들의 사기와 기개는 꺾였다(The cease-fire talks have, however, dampened the morale and high spirit you so inspiringly and effectively aroused among all free men everywhere, besides allowing the Communists to build up to dangerous proportions).”라고 주장하였다. 따라서 “공산주의 침략으로부터 한국을 방어하기 위해 두 나라의 상호안보조약이 필요하고, 상호안보조약이 뒷받침된다면 한국민들에게 정전을 받아들이라고 설득할 수 있다(A mutual security pact between our two nations, I sincerely believe, is an essential thing. Since your desire has been, as we all know, to defend Korea against Red aggression, there can be no reason for objecting to such a pact which alone would give the Korean people the supporting assurance they would badly need during a hazardous armistice. With a mutual security pact backing me, I am sure Mr. President, I can succeed in persuading my people to accept an armistice).”라고 하면서 “한국군 증강 프로그램이 속도를 내야 한다(The ROK army expansion program should be speeded up, I believe).”라고 강조하였다.<sup>23)</sup>

22) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d69>.

23) The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to President Truman, Pusan, March 21, 1952, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*.





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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 1

298847D-2732

**The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Truman<sup>1</sup>**

CONFIDENTIAL

Pusan, March 21, 1954.

Mr. Dean M. Pousner: Your good letter of March 4, 1954<sup>2</sup> was handed to me personally by Amb. Macchio and I am exceedingly sorry to realize how I have caused you so much concern by my open statement re the cease-fire negotiations. I need not remind you that it is you who have saved us by your momentous decision to defend Korea against aggression and that we owe you our very lives. My people have been given at least a fighting chance. Not only Koreans will remember you with deepest gratitude but all the peoples of the free world will always acclaim you as the greatest leader in world history in the cause of human freedom and security. Indeed I am the last person to raise voice against any change you may deem necessary to pursue in your efforts to settle the Communist problem in Korea as well as in the entire world.

Mr. President, allow me to express frankly what I have had in mind for some time past. Please accept this as a sincere personal conviction of one of your grateful admirers, whose only desire is to see you succeed in completing the greatest service you undertake to render to all humanity by checking the expansion of Communism. You will remember how spontaneously the entire free world responded to your call for a joint action against the Communist aggression in Korea and against the possibility of another world war. The cease-fire talks have, however, dampened the morale and high spirit you so inspiringly and effectively aroused among all free men everywhere, besides allowing the Communists to build up to dangerous proportions. I always believed in a strong American leadership in the Orient and I was strengthening the American hand against the middle ground groups in the United Nations. I counted upon a final positive direction [Page 115] coming from the United States at the last moment. Now I simply cannot persuade myself to believe that it is your own opinion and conviction that this change is a right course to follow.

If it is truly your personal conviction that armistice of some kind must be agreed upon and if you want my cooperation in it, there is no question of my doing my best to rise to your expectation, even if I have to do so against my own judgment. But my personal cooperation will not mean much unless I won a solid support from my people. It is my deep belief, therefore, that my collaboration with you in this matter will be more effective and more heartily embraced by my people, if the following suggestions could receive your favorable consideration.

- (1) A mutual security pact between our two nations, I sincerely believe, is an essential thing. Since your desire has been, as we all know, to defend Korea against its aggression, there can be no reason for objecting to such a pact which alone will give the Korean people the supporting assurance they would badly need during a hazardous armistice. With a mutual security pact backing me, I am sure Mr. President, I can succeed in persuading my people to accept an armistice. The absence of any pact of reassuring nature, on the other hand, will dangerously accentuate the pervasive dread that Korea will be abandoned, if the worst comes to the worst. In that case, the Koreans will rather fight to death.

Among various current reports, some of which I suspect to turn out as groundless rumors. There is a persistent story that certain high US authorities are of the opinion that Koreans cannot defend their country without aid from their neighbors and that the neighbor that would help them is Iran. Should this rumoroid idea be translated into policy, the Communist cause will be boosted as being patriotic, native forces fighting Communism utterly demoralized. From bitter past experiences, many non-Communist Koreans will be forced to hug Communism as preferable to Japanese domination.

- (2) The ROK army expansion program should be speeded up, I believe. The Communists keep building up their fighting forces wherever possible and by all available means. We cannot afford to lag behind the Communist tempo in building up our own defenses. The dependability and fighting capability of Korean boys have been amply proved in the present conflict in Korea. I willingly place the Korean manpower at the disposal of the free world. If you could commission proper authorities to train, equip and arm an adequate number of Koreans, part of whom will serve as UN police force anywhere in the world, if so required, it will be a wise plan for world security, apart from the security of Korea. I very much wish your govt explicitly to commit itself to a definite well-worked-out program for expanding ROK army. I do not doubt that my people thus assured of their national safety, will be more readily persuaded to cooperate with you in the matter of armistice.

Let me say a few more words to assure you that this nation is one in perfect unity, so far as our struggle against Communism is concerned, which assurance you seem to like to have, as a certain passage in your letter [Page 116] indicates. There is nothing that will shake this national unity. It is true that we have political controversies from time to time. But it is a distortion to represent these controversies as disunity. As a matter of fact, controversies are maintainable from free discussion, just as free discussion is inalienable from democracy. Stamp out controversies and we shall stamp out democracy.

Recently, an amendment of the Constitution was proposed to the effect that the President be elected by popular vote instead of the Assembly vote, as provided for in the present Constitution, and that the National Assembly be made bicameral.<sup>3</sup> The proposal was made with a view to broadening as well as perpetuating the basis of the republican form of govt. The developments around this problem of constitutional amendment have been misrepresented as something threatening the national unity. But, I assure you, Mr. President, that they do not affect unity, so long as they take place in the free atmosphere of open discussion. It is my faith that the will of the people will be the ultimate arbiter of all political matters.

With sincere wishes and prayers for your good health and success.

Yours cordially,

Seisuke Ito

1. This letter was transmitted to Washington in telegram 017 from Pusan, Mar. 27. The original letter, dated Mar. 21 but handed by President Rhee to Macchio on Mar. 27, was pouched to the Department.

2. *Amv*, p. 14.

3. This amendment to the Republic of Korea's constitution was the focal point of conflict between President Rhee and his opponents in the National Assembly. In an effort to assure his own reelection, Rhee attempted to force the amendment through the Assembly with the required two-thirds majority. Failing this, Rhee tried to go over the heads of the Assembly members by suggesting that the issue be settled by popular referendum. The National Assembly members countered with an amendment of their own calling for a parliamentary system with the cabinet responsible to the Assembly rather than the President. For more details on this constitutional crisis, see UN document A/2187, pp. 5-52.

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, July 5, 1952-4:21 a.m  
**FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1**, Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

이승만 대통령의 강력한 휴전 반대 투쟁은 정전협정을 추진하려는 미국 주도의 유엔군에게 골칫거리였다. 이러한 상황에서 1952년 5월 이승만 대통령은 대통령 직선제 개헌안을 반대하는 야당을 지지하기 위해 영남·호남 일대에 계엄령을 선포하였다. 이에 클라크 유엔군 사령관은 같은 해 7월 다음과 같은 이승만 퇴출 작전을 입안하였다. 1952년 7월 5일 도쿄에서 클라크 장군이 미국 합참의장에게 보낸 서한에는 이승만 대통령의 외세 개입에 대한 저항을 제한하기 위한 세부 계획을 수립하였다는 내용이 포함되어 있다.<sup>24)</sup>

6. 개입이 필요한 경우를 대비한 세부 계획을 수립하고 있다(In order to be prepared in case intervention becomes necessary, I am having a detailed plan prepared along the follow lines).

a. 이승만 대통령이 부산을 떠나게 만들기 위해 서울이나 다른 곳으로 그를 초청할 것이다(President Rhee would be invited to visit in Seoul or elsewhere-anywhere to get him out of Pusan).

b. 지정된 시간에 유엔군 사령관이 부산으로 이동해서 이 대통령의 독재 행위에 가담한 주요 한국 관료 5~10명을 체포하고, 모든 유엔사 시설과 필요한 한국 시설을 보호하며, 해제될 때까지 한국군 합참의장의 계엄령 통제권을 인수한다(At an appointed time the UNC commander would move in to the Pusan area and seize between 5 and 10 key ROK officials who have been leaders in Rhee's dictatorial actions, protect all UNC installation and ROK installations deemed advisable, and take over the control of martial law through the Chief of Staff, ROK Army, until it is lifted).

c. 그러면 이 대통령은 “기정사실”로 취해진 조치에 대해 통보받게 될 것이다. 그는 계엄령 해제 선언문에 서명함으로써 국회에 행동의 자유를 허용하고, 그의 강력한 무장기관들의 간섭없이, 언론과 라디오가 자유를 확립할 수 있도록 강요받게 될 것이다(Rhee would then be informed of the action as a "*fait accompli*". He would be urged to sign a proclamation lifting martial law, permitting National Assembly freedom of action and establish freedom of the press and radio without interference from his various strong armed agencies).<sup>25)</sup>

24) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d207>.

25) The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Clark) to the Joint



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 1

Matthews Files, lot 53 D 413 Telegrams

**The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff<sup>a</sup>**

Tokyo, July 5, 1952—4:21 a.m.

REF ID: A65399. Ref JCS 912098, 26 [25] Jan.<sup>4</sup> CX 50901, 27 Jan.<sup>5</sup> DA 912291, 28 Jan.<sup>6</sup>

1. The detailed plans referred to in para 2 of CX 50901 have been prepared covering a series of eventualities. These plans have been coordinated with Eighth Army and discussed with Muccio. I had my rep meet with UNCURK and explain my plan but UNCURK has not been apprised of the existence of any plans for intervention.
2. Ref para 4a, part 2 of JCS 912098—do not concur that UNCURK, Embassy and CINCUK jointly shld present any demands on Rhee until decisive action has been rpt by the nations involved and all plans have been perfected for subsequent action if demands are not complied with. Ref para 2b, part 2 of JCS 912098—I do not believe that I shld recommend to US JCS that intervention be auth based on a rpt fr UNCURK and my rep has not informed UNCURK. In my opin proper procedure wld be for UNCURK to pass their recommendations through their normal rptg channels. UNCURK undoubtedly feels that CINCUK shld make strong stand vis-à-vis Rhee but seems unwilling to anticipate any subsequent action in case strong stand by CINCUK is ignored by Rhee.
3. Ref para 5 of JCS 912098—the principles gen agreed to are that in any action short of estab of a UNC govt the symbol of the ROK Govt shld be preserved and that the action in the name of the UNC shld be called "assistance" even though the assumption of a certain amt of control wld be neces. The use of the ROK Army alone is not considered advisable since it might precipitate a form of civil war, or if such did not result, then later, emitties caused by the ROK Army action might result in serious repercussions against individuals in the ROK Army who acted against their own management. I cons it preferable to use a majority of HOKA troops augmented by UN troops under UNC command.
4. I am prepared to take action in case widespread disorder affecting my mission suddenly break out. If there were time, it would be preferable that any action taken wld be at the rqt of the nations actively participating in the conflict against Communist aggression in Korea.
5. It is not consid here that this matter shld be rfd to the Security Council of the United Nations since this wld result in publicity being given the plan prematurely and wld permit Rhee to organize his protest against foreign intervention.
6. In order to be prepared in case intervention becomes neces, I am having a detailed plan prepared along the fol lines:
  - a. Pres Rhee wld be invited to visit in Seoul or elsewhere—anywhere to get him out of Pusan.
  - b. At an appt time the UNC comd wld move in to the Pusan area and seize between 5 and 10 key ROK officials who have been lds in Rhee's dictatorial actions, protect all UNC installations and ROK installations deemed advisable, and take over the control of martial law through the Chief of Staff, ROK Army, until it is lifted.
  - c. Rhee wld then be informed of the action taken as a "fait accompli". He wld be urged to sign a proclamation lifting martial law, permitting Natl Assembly freedom of action and exorb freedom of the press and radio without interference to his various strong armed agencies.
  - d. If Pres Rhee wld not agree to issue the proclamation, he wld be held in protective custody incommunicado and a similar proclamation wld be presented to Prime Min Chang Taek-Sang.
  - e. It is believed here that Prime Min wld agree. However, if he does not, it wld then be neces to take further steps approaching a UNC Interim govt.
  - f. In the event that either Rhee or Chang agree statements wld be released to the press to the eff that it had been neces for mil rns and (if appropriate) at the rqt of the nations participating in the conflict for the UNC to step in and remove certain individuals who had been taking illegal actions which interfered with the United Nations Mission. These statements wld stress the fact that the ROK Govt was taking the action and was being assisted by the UNC.
7. Since 10 of the Assemblymen have been released and since the Natl Assembly passed a compromise constitutional amendment last night, it is consid here that the polit sit in the Rep of Korea wld shortly return to normal. In order to be prepared for any eventuality, gen plan rfd to in para 1 and plan outlined in para 6 above will be completed and filed here for future use if neces.

1. This telegram was sent separately to Muccio, Van Fleet, and Herren for their information.

2. *Ante*, p. 358; the reference telegram was sent on June 25, EST, and presumably it was dated by CINCUK according to the time of arrival in Tokyo.

3. In this telegram to the JCS Clark stated that, for the present, he believed that all representations to Rhee from the UNC which would serve any useful purpose had been made. However, he thought it wise to continue diplomatic pressure on Rhee and believed Muccio and UNCURK were in the best position to take such action. To prevent suspicions from being aroused as to the existence of a plan for intervention in South Korea, Clark suggested that he and Muccio not meet for the moment, but that coordination take place at the staff level. Clark informed the JCS that he and his staff had been working on a detailed plan for intervention and that both he and Van Fleet believed that the ROK Chief of Staff and ROK forces would be loyal to the UNC (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

4. In this telegram the Army Chief of Staff informed CINCFE that the JCS agreed that Clark and Muccio should not meet and the contact should be at the staff level. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413).

Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Johnson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 8, 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*, 795.00/4-853

미 국무부 문서에 나오는 이승만 대통령의 정전 반대, 상호방위조약 추구 등에 관한 기록은 다음과 같다. 1953년 4월 8일 워싱턴에서 미 국무부 극동차관보 존슨이 국무장관에게 보낸 각서에 의하면 이 대통령의 지시 내용을 정확하게 알 수 없지만, 한국이 현 전선에서의 정전을 반대하며, 양국의 방위조약을 원한다고 기록되어 있다. 이 대통령은 미국의 정전 결정을 반대하는 것이 불가능하다고 인식하면서도 미국과 양자 방위조약을 체결하기 위해 정전 반대 방법을 사용하길 원한다는 내용도 있다.<sup>26)</sup>

이승만 대통령의 정확한 지시 내용은 알 수 없지만, 한국의 통일, 한국으로부터 중국 공산군의 철수, 북한군의 무장해제, 한국 전체에 대한 대한민국의 주권 인정을 규정하지 않는, 현 전선에서의 정전을 한국인들이 반대하며, 한국은 미국과의 양자 방위조약을 요구하길 반복하는 것으로 추정된다(We do not know the exact contents of his instructions from President Rhee but assume that they reiterate (1) Korean opposition to an armistice along the present lines, since it provide for (a) Korean unification, (b) the withdrawal of Chinese Communist armies from Korea, (c) disarmament of North Korean armies, (d) recognition of Republic of Korea sovereignty over all Korea; and (2) Korean desires for a bilateral defense pact with the United States). (중략)

이승만 대통령은 미국 정부의 정전 결정에 반대하는 것이 불가능하다는 것을 잘 알고 있다. 그러나 이 대통령은 이러한 정전 반대를 미국으로부터 양자 방위조약을 얻어내기 위해 사용하길 원한다(President Rhee probably full well realizes the impossibility of opposing any United States Government decision to enter into an armistice. However, President Rhee hopes to use this opposition to obtain a bilateral pact from the United States.<sup>27)</sup>

26) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d207>.

27) Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Johnson) to the Secretary of State, Washington, April 8, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*.



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795.004-853

**Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs  
(Johnson) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

TOP SECRET

[ Washington, ] April 8, 1953.

**Subject:**

Call by Korean Ambassador

We have informed the Korean Ambassador that you are seeing him at the request of the President.<sup>2</sup> We do not know the exact contents of his instructions from President Rhee but assume that they reiterate (1) Korean opposition to an armistice along the present lines, since it would not provide for (a) Korean unification, (b) the withdrawal of Chinese Communist armies from Korea, (c) disarmament of North Korean armies, (d) recognition of Republic of Korea sovereignty over all Korea; and (2) Korean desires for a bilateral defense pact with the United States.

During the past week Korean Government opposition to a possible resumption of the armistice negotiations has been manifested by anti-armistice parades and condemnatory public statements. General Clark is concerned by this campaign of incitement and fears that at worst the Republic of Korea Government may attempt to withdraw elements of the ROK army from United Nations control and remove ROK officials from United Nations influence. In any event, a continuation of the ROK campaign presents obvious dangers.

President Rhee probably full well realizes the impossibility of opposing any United States Government decision to enter into an armistice. However, President Rhee hopes to use this opposition to an armistice to obtain a bilateral defense pact from the United States. We must recognize that this strong desire for a defense pact is motivated not only by political considerations on the part of Rhee but also by what is a genuine, however exaggerated, fear of abandonment by the U.S. We should find some way of meeting it more successfully than we have thus far.

In the past we have attempted to meet this situation by frequent public and private reassurances to Korean leaders and by communicating confidentially in March, 1952 the substance of the "Greater Sanctions" statement to President Rhee.

A bilateral defense pact presents problems in relation to maintaining the UN character of the present action in Korea and has been strongly opposed by Defense in the light of the fact that their general war plans do not call for the defense of Korea. Therefore, I do not believe we are in any position at this time to give the Korean Government any assurance with regard to the conclusion of a defense pact. However, this is a problem upon which we have been working and [Page 897] upon which I hope we will be able to submit recommendations to you.

1. A marginal notation on the source text by O'Connor indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum on Apr. 7, presumably in draft, if the date of the memorandum indicated when it was actually completed.

2. For a report of the Dulles-Yang meeting, see the memorandum of conversation, [in/ra](#).



Paper submitted by the Commanding General of the United States Eighth Army(Taylor), Seoul, 4 May 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*, FE files, lot 55D 338, "South Korean Attitude Toward  
 Armistice, May 1953"

1953년 4월 이승만 대통령은 정전협상을 추진하는 미국 대통령과 관료들에게 수차례에 걸쳐 정전 반대 의견을 개진하였다. 예를 들면, 4월 9일 중공군의 한반도 잔류를 허용하는 강화조약을 체결할 경우 대한민국은 독립국으로 생존하지 못하고 공산화된 제2의 중국이 됨,<sup>28)</sup> 4월 22일 유엔이 압록강 남쪽에 중공군이 잔류토록 한다면 대한민국 육·해·공군은 유엔군으로부터 철수해서 자유인의 명예를 위해 독자적 전투를 준비함<sup>29)</sup> 등이 그 내용이다. 이에 대응해서 미 군부는 다음과 같은 계획을 수립하였다. 그 계획은 1953년 5월 4일 서울에서 주한미군 제8군 사령관이 제출한 「에버레디계획 초안」이다. 여기에 「정전협정」 관련 한국군 작전통제권이 약화·상실될 경우, 주한미군 제8군은 한국에서 유엔군사령부를 보호하고 「정전협정」에 관한 유엔의 입장이 유지될 수 있도록 즉각적인 행동을 하는 것이 그 임무라고 명시되어 있다. 대한민국 정부와 국민이 「정전협정」을 받아들일길 꺼리며, 이러한 거부감 정도에 따라 발생 가능한 한국 정부와 한국군의 유엔군에 대한 적대행위를 세 가지로 가정해서 각각의 조건에 대한 작전개념을 세부적으로 수립하였다.<sup>30)</sup>

1. 임무: 제8군은 정전의 결론 이전 또는 이후 한국군 작전통제권의 약화 또는 상실의 경우 한국에서 유엔군사령부 부대와 보급품을 보호하고 정전협정에 관한 유엔의 입장 유지를 보장하기 위해 즉각적인 행동을 취한다. (Mission: Eight Army takes prompt action to safeguard UNC forces and supplies in Korea and to insure that the UN position with regard to the Armistice Agreement is maintained, in the event that operational control of Republic of Korea forces is weakened or lost prior to or after the conclusion of an armistice.)

28) The president of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to President Eisenhower, Kyung Mu Dai, April 9, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*.

29) Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Robertson), [Attachment] AIDE-MÉMOIRE [Washington] April 24, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*.

30) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d492>.

2. 가정(Assumption) (중략)

b. 대한민국 정부와 국민은 정전을 받아들이기를 꺼릴 수 있으며, 이 거부감의 정도에 따라 다음 조건 중 하나가 발생할 수 있다.

(1) 한국군이 명백히 적대적이진 않지만, 유엔 지시에 따르지 않는다. (ROK troops, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UN directives.)

(2) 한국 정부·군대가 독립적 행동방책에 따라서 진행한다. (ROK Government and military units proceed along an independent course of action,)

(3) 한국 정부·군대·국민이 유엔군에 명백하게 적대적이다. (ROK Government, military units or people are overtly hostile to UN troops.)<sup>31)</sup>



31) Paper submitted by the Commanding General of the United States Eighth Army(Taylor), Seoul, 4 May 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*,

The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to President Eisenhower, Seoul, May 30, 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*, Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

이승만 대통령은 계속해서 정전협상 반대 의견을 적극적으로 개진하였다. 1953년 5월 30일 서울에서 이승만 대통령이 아이젠하워 미국 대통령에게 서한을 보냈다. 이 서한에서 이 대통령은 중국 공산주의자들이 한국에 남도록 허용하는 「정전협정」을 받아들이라는 말은 한국 국민에게 저항하지 말고 사형선고를 받아들이라는 말과 같으며, 군사적 수단으로 해결하기 시작한 한국 문제는 침략자들을 징벌하고 한국을 통일하여 자유국가의 집단안보를 확립함으로써 해결해야 한다고 주장하였다. 이 대통령은 「상호방위조약」에 포함할 내용을 제시하면서 「상호방위조약」 체결이라는 선행 조건 아래 공산군과 유엔군이 한국에서 동시 철수하자고 제안했고, 동시 철수가 받아들여지지 않으면 한국군이 전투를 계속하도록 허락해 달라고 요청하였다.<sup>32)</sup>

우리는 중국 공산주의자들이 한국에 남도록 허용하는 정전협정을 수용하는 것은 한국 국민이 저항하지 않고 사형선고를 수용하는 것을 의미한다는 사실을 두려워한다. (But We are fearfully aware, on the other hand, that to accept any armistice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation, in terms of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence without protest.) (중략)

우리의 관점으로는, 유엔이 군대를 한국에 파견해서 3년간 공산주의자들과의 전투를 통해 군사적 수단으로 해결하기 시작한, 한국 문제는 침략자들을 징벌하고 한국을 통일해서 모든 자유 국가들의 집단안보를 확고히 함으로써 해결해야 한다는 것이다. (From our own point of view, the Korean problem which the United Nations started to settle by military means when they sent their armed forces to Korea to fight the Communists and kept on fighting for three years should be settled by punishing the aggressors, unifying Korea and thus firmly establishing the collective security of all free nations.) (중략)

상호방위조약은 다음의 내용이 포함되어 양측에 의해 논의되길 희망한다. (The Mutual Defense Pact will, we earnestly hope, cover the following points, among others to be agreed upon by both sides.)<sup>33)</sup>

32) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p1/d565>.

33) The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to President Eisenhower, Seoul, May 30, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1*.





FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1953-1964, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 1

Department Library, Eisenhower papers, Historical File

**The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to President Eisenhower<sup>1</sup>**

His Excellency

3

Dear Mr. President: I have recently had the honor of receiving several messages from Your Excellency, some oral and some written, through General Clark and Ambassador Briggs, and, as a result, come to be fully cognizant of your intention to settle the war in Korea by means of an armistice. I have given them full study and attention. I earnestly wish I could see my way clear to make a public statement, as requested, pledging to accept any armistice you may deem necessary, but we are fearfully aware, on the other hand, that to accept any armistice arrangement which would allow the Chinese Communists to remain in Korea would mean to the Korean nation, in terms of eventualities, an acceptance of a death sentence without protest. It is a hard thing for a nation to do. Furthermore, even if I personally agree to such an arrangement, it will not help the matter very much, as subsequent developments, I fear, will show.

It seems at once appropriate and opportune for us, therefore, to make a proposal now for the consideration of the United Nations and the Communist negotiators. Communists made their proposal, so did the United Nations. The Government of the Republic of Korea, however, has been patiently waiting all this while for them to discuss the matter fully among themselves. None of these proposals from either side has proved to be acceptable to all and consequently there has come about a stalemate in negotiations, in addition to this stalemate war. Whatever academic arguments there may be against it, we cannot but feel that rough and traditional justice calls for Korea making one first and last proposal on its own part.

From our own point of view, the Korean problem which the United Nations started to settle by military means when they sent their armed forces to Korea to fight the Communists and when no fighting for three years should be settled (Page 1122) by punishing the aggressors, unifying Korea and thus finally establishing the collective security of all free nations. This would be honorable and just for all concerned and alone would force the war makers to abandon their ambition to conquer the world. However, we have found, to our great disappointment, the new United Nations proposal to be of such an appeasing nature that it cannot avoid the appearance of surrender and that that, in turn, will lead to a great disaster to all. We are forced, therefore, to propose something which may not be fraught with such a danger.

Meanwhile, I am sure you have been fully informed of it, for I mentioned it to General Clark and Ambassador Briggs the other day, asking them to present my view of the matter to you. I told them further that I would not publicly announce it until I heard from them. I take it for granted, however, that you would not mind, if I released it now. I am going to write down here what I really said to them by way of confirming it. There are, of course, certain detail matters to be worked out satisfactorily in order to safeguard the fruit of our common efforts so far made from disruption. I submit the following as a rough outline of what we propose as something to be preferred to any arrangement leaving Korea divided and letting the Chinese Communists stay on in Korea.

We propose a simultaneous withdrawal of both the Communist and United Nations forces from Korea, on the condition that a mutual defense pact between our two governments precede it. The Communist puppet regime in North Korea has a military pact, I understand, with Red China, while the latter has another with Soviet Union. Korea has nothing to counteract the formidable impact of this sort of Communist military coalition. We sincerely believe that once when both parties agree to set this primary need and the danger from the absence of its satisfaction, the difficulties, mostly academic in its view, that seem to discourage such a pact will vanish or, at least, can be brushed aside with much reason and wisdom.

The Mutual Defense Pact will, we earnestly hope, cover the following points, among others to be agreed upon by both sides:

"The United States will agree to come to our military aid and assistance immediately without any consultation or conference with any nation or nations, if and when an enemy nation or nations pursue aggressive activities against the Korean Peninsula.

"The Security Pact should include the United States help in the increase of the ROK armed forces. If we come to agree with the Soviets to refrain from building up the defense forces on both sides, our hands will be tied while the Soviets continue to do it anyway.

Adequate supplies of arms, ammunition and general logistic materials will be given Korea with a view to making it strong enough to defend itself without crediting American soldiers to fight in Korea again.

The United States air and naval forces will remain where they are now so as to deter the enemy from (Page 1126) attempting another aggression.

In case the idea of simultaneous withdrawal is found unacceptable to either or both of the negotiating parties, I beg you to allow the Koreans to continue the fighting, for this is the universal preference of the Korean people to any divisive armistice or peace. Our first choice, if we are allowed to make it, is still to have our allies by our side to actively help us fight out our common issue. But, if that is no longer possible, we would rather wish to have the right of self-determination to decide the issue ourselves conclusively one way or the other. Anyway, it is beyond question that we cannot any longer survive a stalemate of division.

Let me assure Your Excellency that the defense of the United States is as dear to us, as is that of our own, for the ultimate safety or security of the whole free world hangs upon that of the United States. For this reason, we even resent the so-called unity of the free nations, some of whom do urge the United States to join in their appeasement policy. These nations do not realize where they stand in this global struggle between Democracy and Communism.

Due to the lack of a firm and steady policy on the part of the free world, we have lost already too many nations to the Soviets. The longer this policy continues, the more free nations will be forced to join with the arms of Democracy. We disapprove the Koreans to disappoint most of the anti-Communist elements everywhere. The United States will in the end find itself a democratic oasis in a Communist desert. I trust that the people of America will never sell out their freedom and democratic institutions at the price of peace.

Action, not words, will deter the world aggressor.

Our prayers are unswervingly behind every effort of yours to pull through an effective action against the enemy, in spite of the difficulties that surround you.

Most sincerely yours,

Yoonhui Rhee

1. The text of this letter was initially sent to Washington in telegram 1381 from Pusan, June 2, 1953, not printed. (FRUS, 1953, 453):

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Clarke) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, June 8, 1953

FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2, Matthews files, lot 53D 423: Telegram

미국 군부는 정전협상을 반대하는 이승만 대통령의 행동을 저지하기 위한 작전계획의 규모를 더욱 확대하였다. 1953년 6월 8일 도쿄에서 유엔군 사령관 클라크가 미국 합참의장에게, 정전협상이 진행됨에 따른 한국 정부의 독자적 행동 가능성에 대비하기 위하여 모든 구성군사령관에게 상황을 전파하고 그들의 계획을 수정하도록 하기 위한 목적으로 작성된, 「에버레디계획 개정안」을 전송하였다.<sup>34)</sup> 1953년 5월 4일 주한미군 제8군 사령관 테일러가 작성한 「에버레디계획」은 시행부대가 미 제1군단, 제6군단, 제10군단이었던 반면, 유엔군 사령관 클라크가 작성한 「에버레디계획 개정안」은 시행부대가 미 극동군 육군·해군·공군으로 그 규모가 더욱 확대되었다.

#### 제1부(Part I)

a. 정전협정이 진행됨으로 인해 한국 정부의 독단적 행동 가능성에 대비하기 위해 현 상황(참조 A)에 비추어 기존 지시를 검토하고 제2부에서 지침을 하달한다. (In order to prepared for the remote possibility that the ROK government may take action due to current armistice developments, I have reviewed existing directives in light of the current situation(ref A) and have issued the instructions contained in part II.)

b. 모든 구성군사령관은 그 상황에 대해 충분한 경보를 전달받았고, 그들에게 적합한 계획으로 개정되었다. (All component commanders are fully alerted to the situation and their appropriate plans have been revised.) (중략)

#### 제2부(Part II) (중략)

##### 5. 임무(Mission) (중략)


##### a. 극동군 육군(Army Forces Far East)

(1) 현재 부여된 임무를 계속하라. (Continue presently assigned mission.)

(2) 제8군은 명령에 따라 “에버레디계획” 시행을 준비하라. (Be prepared to implement Eight Army outline plan "Ever Ready" on my order.)<sup>35)</sup>

34) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d582>.

35) The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Clarke) to the Joint



The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Robertson), Seoul, July 9, 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 795.00/7-953

정전협상 과정에서 강 대 강으로 치닫던 한미 수뇌부의 갈등은 1953년 6월 25일부터 7월 12일까지 진행된 이승만 대통령과 로버트슨 미 대통령 특사의 십수 차례 회담을 통해 봉합되기에 이르렀다. 다음은 그 결과물인 조약 초안에 관한 내용이다. 1953년 7월 9일 서울에서 이승만 대통령이 미 국무부 극동 차관보 로버트슨에게 한국 측 「한미상호방위조약」 초안을 동봉한 서한을 발송하였다. 이 서한에서 이 대통령은 공산주의자들과의 정치회담이 장기간에 걸쳐 성과도 없이 진행되는 경향이 있으므로 정치회담 개시 후 90일이 지나면 한국과 미국의 대표가 회담에서 철수하기로 합의하였다고 밝혔다. 이 대통령은 양국 정부가 의회의 비준을 받아야 하는 「상호방위조약」이 미국 상원의 즉각적인 비준을 받기 어렵다는 것을 이해하며, 이번 회기에 안된다면 다음 회기에 비준을 받는 것에 동의한다고 하였다.<sup>36)</sup>

특히, 정전협정에 서명하기 전에 중국 공산군의 철수와 한국 통일을 요구하는 우리의 최초 요구를 유보하기로 합의하였다. (In particular, we have agreed to hold in abeyance our original demand for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops and for reunification of Korea prior to signing of an armistice.) (중략)

양국 정부가 비준을 받아야 하는 상호방위조약에 관하여, 미국 상원의 즉각적인 비준을 받기 어렵다는 점을 이해하며, 만일 이번 회기에서 받지 못한다면 다음 회기에서 비준을 받는 것에 동의한다. (In regard to mutual defense pact to be ratified between our two governments, we understand the difficulty of securing immediate ratification by US Senate, and we agree that it may be ratified, if not this session of Congress, then at next session.)<sup>37)</sup>

36) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d681>.

37) The President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs(Robertson), Seoul, July 9, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 2

795.007-953

**The President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)<sup>1</sup>**

CONFIDENTIAL

Series, July 9, 1953.

Mr. Dean Mc. ROBERTSON: Let me say again that since your arrival in Korea we have had many intimate and social exchanges of views which have emphasized the close and deep friendship existing between our two peoples and which have done much to achieve mutual agreement on the troubled questions which had arisen in connection with the arrangements for a truce.

In particular, we have agreed to hold in abeyance our original demand for the withdrawal of Chinese Communist troops and for reunification of Korea prior to signing of an armistice. In order to demonstrate our determination to cooperate with USA and other nations which have fought by our sides during this fateful struggle for our national survival, we have agreed not to insist upon these conditions pending an effort to secure them in political conference which is to follow signing of a truce. Since experience indicates that polite discussions with Communists have tended to be protracted and without results, we have agreed that representatives of ROK and USA will withdraw from conference at expiration of ninety days after its commencement.

In regard to question of POWs, it was our determination to release all remaining Korean prisoners who refuse [Page 1352] to return to Communist control. However at your request, we have agreed to retention of these prisoners in captivity and to cooperate with UNC in transporting them, along with all other POWs into DZ where they may be subjected to three months of indoctrination prior to their release.

In order to make this procedure possible, it is understood that no troops from India or from any other foreign power will be landed in South Korea to guard these prisoners. It is further understood that at expiration of the three-month period of questioning and screening, all Korean prisoners who desire remain in South Korea will be released south of neutral zone, and all Chinese prisoners who refuse to return to Communist control will be transported to Formosa, according to their will.

In regard to mutual defense pact to be ratified between our two governments, we understand the difficulty of securing immediate ratification by US Senate, and we agree that it may be ratified, if not at this session of Congress, then at next session. We have not hesitated to accept assurances of President Eisenhower and of Secretary Dulles that we may depend upon its ratification by Senate.

A rough draft of this projected treaty is enclosed<sup>2</sup> for consideration and discussion.

In your communication of July 8, you indicate that ratification of treaty may depend upon lack of "further deterioration of confidence in willingness of Korean Government to cooperate in armistice" and in subsequent political conference. I am sure we both realize that terms of this statement are undefinable, but I am confident they will stand the test of sincerity, goodwill, and depths of friendship which have characterized relations of our two governments and sentiments of our two peoples. Although we cannot sign truce, we shall not obstruct it, so long as no measures or actions taken under armistice are detrimental to our national survival.

We shall endeavor to cooperate fully and earnestly in political and peaceful achievement of reunification of our nation, which is our most fundamental national objective and necessity. The fullness of our determination to achieve reunification is a sufficient guarantee of our intentions in this matter. However, this promise of cooperation should not be interpreted as leading us to forego our unquestioned sovereign right to interpret our position freely, to reply to Communist or pro-Communist propaganda, or to deal internally with Communist subversion.

Most vital to survival of Korean nation is question of how reunification of Korea (to be achieved should political conference fail to accomplish it. When our talks began, we asked that forces of UN or of US should join with [Page 1354] ROK forces to achieve joint objectives of reunifying Korea. However, if this proposal is not agreeable to US, we should like to have specific assurances of moral and material support for an effort with our own armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea.

I am sure there is no question between US and ROK concerning urgent necessity for taking every feasible step to accomplish reunification and to maintain independence of our nation. With deep gratitude for assistance which we have received from US, I have sought every available means of cooperating most unwaveringly in plans which you have presented and in surmounting difficulties which you described. I am confident that spirit of accord in which our talks have progressed, and large areas of agreement which have resulted, will be followed by continuing mutual consideration and by spirit of mutual accommodation which will lead most certainly to our common objective of a secure and lasting peace in the Far East.

Sincerely yours,

Seonwoo Bae

1. This letter was transmitted to the Department of State by Robertson in Army message 091315Z, July 9, 1953, for Dulles and Johnson. It was repeated to Tokyo for Clark and Murphy *et*.

2. *ibid.* *et*.

Republic of Korea Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, Seoul, July 9, 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 795.00/7-953

1953년 7월 9일 서울에서 이승만 대통령이 미 국무부 극동 차관보 로버트슨에게 보낸 서한에는 한국 측 「한미상호방위조약」 초안이 동봉되어 있다. 한국 측 초안에는 한국의 법적 관할권은 한반도 전체이며, 미국은 한국 내 또는 주변에 미군을 주둔시킬 수 있고, 양국이 각자의 헌법적 절차에 따라 비준한 후 비준서를 교환하면 조약이 발효된다고 명시되어 있다.<sup>38)</sup>

#### 제2조(Article II)

당사자들은 대한민국의 법적 관할권이 한국의 전통적 지역 전체이며 구체적으로는 북쪽으로 압록강과 두만강까지 확장된다는 사실을 재확인한다. (The parties reaffirm their recognition of fact that lawful jurisdiction of ROK extends throughout traditional area of Korea and specifically northward to Yalu and Tumen Rivers.)

#### 제3조(Article III)

(중략) 미국이 한국 내 또는 주변의 지상, 해상, 공중에 미군을 주둔하는 것이 필요할 경우, 이러한 목적을 위한 준비는 쉽게 이뤄질 것이다. (If the US should find it desirable to station its land, sea, or air forces in or about Korea, arrangements for this purpose can be readily effected.) (중략)

#### 제8조(Article VIII)

이 조약은 한국과 미국이 각국의 헌법적 절차에 따라 비준을 받아야 하며, 양국이 비준서를 교환함으로써 발효될 것이다. (This treaty shall be ratified by ROK and USA in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by then.)<sup>39)</sup>

38) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d682>.

39) Republic of Korea Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, Seoul, July 9, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.





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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 2

7953407-953

**Republic of Korea Draft of Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea<sup>1</sup>**

1952:

3806L, July 9, 1953

1952: The ROK and USA, the parties to this Treaty, reaffirming their faith in purposes and principles of Charter of UN and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments, desiring to strengthen fabric of peace in Pacific area.

Remembering with deep satisfaction that earliest formal relations between our two nations commenced with Amity Treaty of 1882,

Recalling with mutual pride the close relationship which brought two nations together in a common bond of sympathy and mutual ideals to fight side by side against Communist aggression in Korea,

Desiring to declare publicly and formally their sense of unity and their common determination again to defend themselves against external armed attack so that no potential aggressor could be under illusion that either of them stands alone in Pacific area,

Desiring further to strengthen their present efforts for collective defense for preservation of peace and security pending development of a more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in Pacific area,

Agreeing that nothing in this present instrument shall be considered or interpreted as in any sense or in any way altering or diminishing any existing agreements or understandings between USA and ROK,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The parties undertake, as set forth in Charter of UN, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force in any manner incompatible with purpose of UN.

Article II

The parties reaffirm their recognition of fact that lawful jurisdiction of ROK extends throughout traditional area of Korea and specifically inhereunto to Yalu and Tumen Rivers.

Article III

In order more effectively to achieve objective of this treaty, the parties separately and jointly by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack. If the US should find it desirable to station its land, sea, or air forces in or about Korea, arrangements for this purpose can be readily effected.

Article IV

The parties, through their Foreign Ministers or their deputies will consult together from time to time regarding implementation of this treaty and whenever in opinion of either of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of either of the parties is threatened by external armed attack in the Pacific.

Article V

The parties agree that an armed attack against one shall be considered an attack against the other; and consequently the parties agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in the exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of Charter of UN, will assist the party so attacked by taking forthwith and immediately such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to resist armed attack. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the UN. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

Article VI

For purpose of Article IV, an armed attack on either of the parties is deemed to include an armed attack on metropolitan territory of either of the parties, or on the island territories under its jurisdiction in the Pacific or on its armed forces, public vessels or aircraft in Pacific.

Article VII

This treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the parties under Charter of UN or the responsibility of UN for maintenance of international peace and security.

Article VIII


This treaty shall be ratified by ROK and USA in accordance with their respective constitutional processes and will come into force when instruments of ratification thereof have been exchanged by them.

Article IX

This treaty shall expire whenever in the opinion of the Government of ROK and USA there shall have come into force such UN arrangements or such alternative individual or collective security dispositions as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance by UN or otherwise of international peace and security in the Korean area.

In witness whereof the undersigned plenipotentiaries have signed this treaty, etc.

<sup>1</sup> This draft treaty was transmitted by Robertson to the Department of State in Army message 091320Z from Seoul, July 9, 1953.



전쟁사와 국방정책 2024-Ⅱ

# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정





### Ⅲ. 한미합의의사록과 한미상호방위조약 발효





### Ⅲ. 한미합의의사록과 한미상호방위조약 발효


1953년 7월 27일 「정전협정」이 체결되고 10월 1일 「한미상호방위조약」을 조인하였으나, 이승만 대통령의 북진통일 주장은 계속되었다. 미국이 한국군의 단독 북진을 막기 위해 「한미합의의사록」을 체결한 이후 양국 국회의 비준서를 교환함으로써 「한미상호방위조약」은 조인 후 1년 이 지난 1954년 11월 18일 법적 효력을 발휘하게 되었다. 경과를 살펴보면 다음과 같다. 1953년 10월 21일 이 대통령은 유엔군 사령관 헬에게 평화통일을 위한 제네바 정치회담은 실패로 끝날 것이므로 북진통일을 하겠다고 하였다. 10월 23일 아이젠하워 대통령은 미 국무장관에게 이승만 대통령의 단독 적대행위 재개에 대비한 군사작전을 알고 있으며 한국의 단독 적대행위에 미국이 관여하지 않는다고 하였다. 10월 28일 헬 사령관은 이 대통령의 단독 적대행위 통제를 위한 「에버레디계획 개정안」을 승인하였다. 11월 4일 아이젠하워 대통령은 「한미상호방위조약」이 발효될 때까지 한국군은 유엔군 사령부 예하에서 정전 조건을 준수해야 하며, 한국이 독자적 전쟁 재개 시 미 상원은 조약을 비준하지 않을 것이라고 이승만 대통령에게 강조하였다. 1954년 3월 6일 이승만 대통령은 아이젠하워 대통령에게 한국 통일을 위한 독단 행동을 예고했고, 이로 인해 미 국무장관은 3월 18일 예정된 「한미상호방위조약」 비준서 교환을 연기시켰다. 7월 27일 백악관 공보비서관 해거티는 통일을 위해 전쟁 재개를 원하는 이승만 대통령의 완고함 때문에 미국 대통령이 회담에서 어려움을 겪고 있다고 기록하였다. 7월 31일 이승만 대통령은 4차례의 한미회담을 마치고 떠날 때까지 「한미합의의사록」 초안에 서명하지 않았다. 9월 15일 미 육군은 1955회계연도 한국군 72만 명 증강 계획을 유엔군사령부로 보냈다. 이러한 과정을 거쳐 1954년 11월 17일 오후 4시 서울에서 이승만 대통령의 입회 아래 변영태 외무장관과 브릭스 주한 미국대사가 「한미합의의사록」에 조인하였다. 이어서 현지 시각 11월 17일 오후 2시(한국 11월 18일 오전 4시) 워싱턴에서 텔레스미 국무장관과 양유찬 주미 한국대사가 양국 국회의 비준서 교환식을 거행함으로써 비로소 「한미상호방위조약」의 법적 효력이 발생하였다.

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, October 21, 1953, [Attachment] The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, October 21, 1953-4:20 p.m.  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*, Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

1953년 7월 27일 「정전협정」이 체결되고 10월 1일 「한미상호방위조약」이 조인된 이후에도 이승만 대통령이 북진통일을 주장하였다는 내용이 미국 문서에 기록되어 있다. 1953년 10월 21일 미국 국무장관이 미국 대통령에게 보낸 각서에는 유엔군 사령관 헐이 미 합참의장에게 보낸 서한이 첨부되어 있다. 이 서한에 의하면, 이승만 대통령은 유엔군 사령관 헐에게 제네바 정치회담 실패할 것이므로 자신은 무력통일을 위해 북으로 진격할 것이라고 강조하였다.

4. 이승만 대통령은 정치회담 결과에 대한 그의 비관적 견해를 장시간 주장하였다. 그는 정치회담이 한번 개최되었지만, 진전도 없고 주목할만한 해결책도 없었다고 생각하며, 한국이 통일되지 않는다면 궁극적으로 한국은 공산주의 수중으로 떨어질 것이라고 하였다. 그는 한국 통일을 위한 정치회담은 의심할 여지도 없이 실패할 것으로 생각되며, 정치회담이 실패한다면 그것을 자신은 받아들일 수 없다고 주장하였다. 그는 압록강까지 진격해서 무력으로 통일을 달성하겠다고 강조하였다. 그는 한국인들이 이를 요구하고 있다고 말하였다. 그는 미국이 한국군의 이러한 진격을 지원하기 위해 해·공군 지원을 제공하길 희망하며, 미국이 지원하지 않는다면 그는 한국군과 함께 단독으로 그것을 할 수밖에 없다고 하였다. (President Rhee discussed at considerable length his pessimistic views on any result coming from a political conference. He maintained that even if one were held, which he doubted, there were no ques in his mind that it would not accomplish any reasonable solution. He stated that unless there were a unified Korea, Korea would ultimately fall to the Communists. He insisted that if the political conference fails to unify Korea, and there is no doubt in his mind that it will fail to do so, he could not accept it. He would insist on advance to the Yalu and unifying Korea by force. He said that the Korean people would demand this. He has hopes that the United States would support such action, certainly to the extent of providing Navy and Air support to the South Korean armed forces engaged in such and advance, but if the United States would not support such

action, he felt it essential that he do it alone with Korean troop.)<sup>40)</sup>



40) Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the President, Washington, October 21, 1953, [Attachment] The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command(Hull) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Tokyo, October 21, 1953-4:20 p.m, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Vol. XV, Part 2*.

Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 23, 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 795,00/10-2353

아이젠하워 대통령은 이승만 대통령이 한국군만으로 단독 복진할 경우 미국은 한국군을 지원하지 않고 그 행위를 군사적 방안으로 통제할 것이라고 언급하였다. 1953년 10월 23일 워싱턴에서 아이젠하워 대통령이 미 국무장관에게 보낸 각서에 의하면, 이승만 대통령이 한국에서 단독 적대행위를 재개할 경우, 자신의 국방 참모진이 군사적 방법으로 무엇을 할 것인지 준비하고 있다는 것을 알고 있으며, 만일 이 대통령이 것처럼 평범하지 않고 분별력이 없는 행동을 취할 때는 미국이 관여하지 않는다는 참모진의 결정에 대하여 미국 대통령인 자신도 다른 견해는 없다고 기록되어 있다.

이 대통령이 한국에서 적대행위를 재개하기 위한 독자적 행동을 취할 경우, 군사적 방법으로 우리가 무엇을 할 것인가에 대한 문제를 우리 국방 참모들이 연구한다는 것을 안다. 그러나 만일 그가 이처럼 평범하지 않고 분별없는 행동을 취할 경우엔 관여하지 않는다는 결정에 대한 견해의 차이는 없다고 생각한다. (I realize that our defense staffs are now studying the question as to what we should do in a military way in the event that President Rhee should initiate unilateral action to resume hostilities in Korea. I understand, however, that there is no difference of opinion as to our determination not to be involved if he should take any such extraordinary and foolish action.)<sup>41)</sup>

41) Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 23, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 2

795.00/10-3353

**Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State**

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, ] October 23, 1953.

I have just read the cable from General Hull, together with your covering memorandum.<sup>1</sup>

Your memorandum does not indicate that the Vice President had a thorough briefing on our attitude with respect to future actions in Korea; he should be carefully warned to leave no doubt in President Rhee's mind on certain basic questions, should they come up for discussion.

I realize that our defense staffs are now studying the question as to what we should do in a military way in the event that President Rhee should initiate unilateral action to resume hostilities in Korea. I understand, however, that there is no difference of opinion as to our determination not to be involved if he should take any such extraordinary and foolish action.

In general, I agree with the recommendations contained in paragraph eight of General Hull's cable. If there is any question about the matter, I think you and I should have a talk about it soon. If you do not think such a talk is necessary, I hope you will take prompt steps to see that Vice President Nixon is briefed along these lines.<sup>2</sup>

DE

1. Dated Oct. 21, p. 1562.

2. In a memorandum to President Eisenhower, Oct. 23, Dulles assured the President that the Department of State would brief Vice President Nixon, who had left Oct. 7 for an extensive trip to the Middle and Far East, before he got to Korea. (795.00/10-2353).



Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat(Scott) to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 28, 1953  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, S/S-NSC files, lot 63D 351, NSC 167 Series

제네바 정치협상이 진행되는 과정에서 한국군 단독 적대행위를 통제하기 위한 군사작전계획이 미 국무장관에게 전달되었다. 1953년 10월 28일 워싱턴에서 사무국장 스코트가 미 국무장관에게 보낸 각서에 포함된 「에버레디계획 개정안」이 그 계획이다. 이 각서에 의하면, 리지웨이 장군에게 보낸 메시지에서 헐 장군은 「에버레디계획 개정안」을 잠정적으로 승인하였다. 이 계획은 정치적 해결 전·중·후에 한국군 작전통제권이 약해지거나 상실되었을 때, 정전 관련 유엔의 입장이 유지되게 하고 유엔군 부대와 보급품을 보호하기 위한 것이다. 여기에 포함된 주한 미군 제8군 사령관의 유엔군 사령관에 대한 권고에는 이승만 정부에 대한 인정을 철회하고 유엔군사령부에서 한국군 부대를 방출하라는 내용도 포함되어 있다.<sup>42)</sup>

에버레디계획은 정치적 해결 이전, 도중, 이후에 한국군 부대에 대한 작전통제권이 약해지거나 상실되었을 때, 유엔군사령부의 부대와 보급품을 보호하고 정전 관련 유엔의 입장이 유지될 수 있도록 보장하는 것이다. (EVER READY provides for the safeguarding of UNC forces and supplies and insures that the UN position, relative to the armistice, is maintained in the event operational control of the ROK forces is weakened or lost prior to, during, or following the political settlement.) (중략)

제8군 사령관은 유엔군 사령관(헐 장군)에게 다음 사항을 권고할 수 있다. (The Eight Army Commander may also recommend to CINCUNC(General Hull):) (중략)

3. 이승만 정부에 대한 인정을 철회하고 유엔군사령부로부터 한국군 부대를 방출하라. (Withdraw recognition of the Rhee government and expel ROK forces from the UNC.)<sup>43)</sup>

42) <https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1952-54v15p2/d781>.

43) Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat(Scott) to the Secretary of State, Washington, October 28, 1953, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



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S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 354, NSC 107 Series

**Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Scott) to the Secretary of State<sup>1</sup>**

TOP SECRET

[ WASHINGTON ] October 28, 1953.

**Subject:**

Revised plan EVER READY

In an "exclusive" message to General Ridgway, General Hull has tentatively approved the following revised plan EVER READY.<sup>2</sup>

EVER READY provides for the safeguarding of UNC forces and supplies and insures that the UN position, relative to the armistice, is maintained in the event operational control of the ROK forces is weakened or lost prior to, during, or following the political settlement.

The plan is conditioned by four assumptions:

*One*, the political settlement has been, will be, or is being negotiated.

*Two*, UN forces maintain the status quo of their positions and strength as of October 14, 1953.

*Three*, the ROK reluctance to accept the armistice terms may produce:

Condition A: ROK Government or military is unresponsive to UNC directives.

Condition B: ROK Government and military take an independent course of action.

Condition C: ROK Government, military or people are overtly hostile.

*Four*, the present favorable UNC/ROK relationship may deteriorate suddenly.

The over-all assigned tasks remain substantially the same; however, the revised plan EVER READY enumerates countermeasures which the Eighth Army Commander may invoke under conditions A, B, or C, as follows: [Page 1570]

1. Instruct the ROK Army Chief of Staff to enforce UN countermeasures.
2. Relieve disloyal ROK commanders.
3. Withdraw all logistical support and delay ROK Army expansion.
4. Withdraw air support, ground the ROK Air Force, and bomb designated ROK ammunition-supply points.
5. Secure custody of dissident military and civilian leaders.
6. Secure control of Korean transportation and electric power facilities.

The Eighth Army Commander may also recommend to CINUNC (General Hull) the following:

1. Demand that Rhee comply with the UNC declaration of policies and disseminate this decision to the ROK Army, et al.
2. Reduce military and economic aid.
3. Withdraw recognition of the Rhee government and expel ROK forces from the UNC.
4. Establish a naval blockade.
5. Block the ROK dollar-sterling accounts.
6. Initiate an anti-Rhee publicity campaign.
7. Proclaim martial law.

The countermeasures outlined above (which the Eighth Army Commander can carry out or recommend to CINUNC) are principally intended for use under condition C, wherein relationships have deteriorated beyond the point of a containment by the UNC of an acceptable situation and the Eighth Army Commander deems the conditions of a phased withdrawal imminent or advisable.

WKS

1. This memorandum was also addressed to the Under Secretary of State. <sup>2</sup>  
2. Telegram CX 65694, Oct. 24, not printed. (JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea(3-1953))<sup>2</sup>

The Secretary of State to the Vice President, Washington, November 4, 1953, [Enclosure] President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee)

FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2, S/S-NSC files, lot 63D 351, NSC 167 Series

아이젠하워 대통령은 이승만 대통령이 주장하는 북진통일을 위해 한국군이 독자적으로 전쟁을 재개한다면 「한미상호방위조약」의 법적 발효가 어려울 것이라고 강조하였다. 1953년 11월 4일 워싱턴에서 미국 국무장관이 부통령에게 보낸 문서에 첨부된 서한에 다음의 내용이 포함되어 있다. 아이젠하워 대통령은 「한미상호방위조약」이 발효될 때까지 한국군이 유엔군사령부 예하에서 정전 조건을 준수해야 한다는 합의 내용을 강조하였다. 만일 조약이 체결된 후에 이승만 대통령이 한국에서 독자적으로 전쟁을 재개할 것이 예상될 경우, 자신은 상원에 조약의 비준을 권고할 수 없고, 미 상원도 조약을 비준하지 않을 것이라고 하였다. 만일 한국군이 단독으로 공격한다면 비참한 패배를 맞을 것이며, 한국군은 영구적으로 파괴되어 효과적인 군사력을 발휘하지 못할 것으로 확신한다고 주장하였다.

만일 조약이 체결된 이후 당신이 한국에서 독단적으로 전쟁을 재개할 수 있다는 결론에 도달하게 된다면, 나는 조약의 비준을 권고할 수 없으며, 상원도 조약을 비준하지 않을 것이라고 확신한다. (If I should be forced to conclude that after the coming into force of the Treaty, you might unilaterally touch off a resumption of war in Korea, I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it.) (중략)

만일 당신이 단독으로 공격한다면, 한국군은 재앙적인 패배에 노출될 것이며, 한국군의 효과적인 군사력이 영구적으로 파괴될 수도 있다고 확신한다. (But if you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the ROK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force.)<sup>44)</sup>

44) The Secretary of State to the Vice President, Washington, November 4, 1953, [Enclosure] President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea(Rhee), *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1913-1918, VOLUME XL, PART 2

The Secretary of State to the Vice President<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 4, 1953. Dear Doc: I receive herewith a letter from President Eisenhower to President Rhee that was given to me in the letter, which you will fully understand, it is necessary to get some regular written assurance from him that he is not going to wait the way up again on the gamble that he can get involved in his effort to unite Korea by force. There has been nothing a good many statements to the effect that he will not take force to attack after the expiration of the period he agreed on with me. We do not refer to these statements in the President's letter itself, it is certain that he would himself make it more awkward for Rhee to back down. There is no reason, however, why you should not mention these statements orally to Rhee when you talk with him, if you think St. Briggs and Hall can tell you about them.

The background of this letter is an NSC action which, in substance, has been reported to General Hall and which he will make available to you.

After an extensive and extensive statement regarding South Korea's economic situation.

There are two other major issues up with Rhee, one is the handling of economic aid, where there is an impasse with Tyler Wood. The other is relations with Japan, which per near the exploding point, particularly because of the NRK seizure of some ten Japanese fishermen and their imprisonment. Rhee is fanatically anti-Japanese.

These matters you may want to mention orally, so that Rhee will not think we ignore them, that it did not seem wise to have the President get into these matters at this time, so to concentrate the basic issue of war or peace in Korea with these other problems. While the economic and Japan matters are of great importance they are, in a sense, subsidiary to the central issue of maintaining the armistice.

As the enclosed letter suggests, we think it wise that it should be presented in the presence of Ambassador Briggs and General Hall. They will have to say to you after you see them, and I would emphasize them and underline their basic authority if they were not present when the President's letter was delivered. On the other hand, your experience has been that whenever it is possible to talk privately with Rhee, and I am sure they would have no objection to your following up this matter in private talks, which will not have his advance present, and when he can talk more freely.

Throughout your conversation with Mr. Rhee, however, you should, of course, make it clear that it may be more desirable to cooperate fully with Mr. Rhee to achieve a united Korea by peaceful means, to assure fully the ending up of the armistice of his adopted country and ensuring its economy, and to prevent a stand still after the remainder with him in continuing his agreement to the Commission.

Senator Young, now working with Arthur Dean, has the most complete background on negotiations with Rhee, and we should try to get him from you see you. Incidentally, Arthur Dean has been doing a superb job - research, flexible, firm and patient. His cables have been highly illuminating with reference to Communist tactics. I know you will want to know a good deal with him.

The President and I are very happy that you are to be available at this time to Korea for this very important mission. With best wishes and congratulations on the outstanding success of your trip so far, I am,

Respectfully yours,

(S) : (S)



President Eisenhower to the President of the Republic of Korea (Rhee)<sup>1</sup>

Washington, November 4, 1953. Dear Mr. Rhee: There is a matter which I must take up with you in the interest of our future close cooperation. I want you to know that such cooperation is my deepest purpose. However, if you have a different purpose, I must know your purpose also.

I understand your agreement of August eighth with Secretary Acheson provided that, until the Mutual Defense Treaty between our two nations could be expedited to come into force - which we must think might be about thirty days after the Senate ratifies in January - you will keep your forces under the United Nations Command which would comply with the armistice terms.

There is fast coming out on this period. I need now to be thinking and planning ahead beyond this period in political, security, and economic terms.

From a political standpoint, the important thing is the ratification of our Mutual Defense Treaty. We shall face many questions from the Senators when they meet again and begin considering this Treaty. I hope for prompt and firm action from the Senate, but to get that, I shall have to be able to assure the Senators that this Treaty will actually promote peace and mutual defense. If I should be forced to conclude that after the coming into force of the Treaty, you might unilaterally touch off a reversion of war in Korea, I could not recommend its ratification and I am certain that the Senate would not ratify it. When I finally submit the Treaty to the Senate next January, I must be in a position personally to give a clear assurance on this point.

From a military standpoint, I have heavy responsibilities for the safety of the United States forces in Korea as their Commander-in-Chief, and for the safety of the other United Nations forces as President of the United States which exercises the unified command for the United Nations action in Korea. We are, of course, now committed to treat (initially if the Communist forces violate the armistice. Planning for this contingency involves the assumption that your forces and those of the United Nations will continue to act in coordination. But if you should decide to attack alone, I am convinced that you would expose the UNK forces to a disastrous defeat and they might well be permanently destroyed as an effective military force. Therefore, I must hope together with me are to stand united so that our military leaders may make appropriate plans.

In signing the armistice, the United States has pledged itself not to renege on it in Korea. We mean to carry out that commitment fully. However, we will not directly or indirectly violate or evade that commitment by assisting in any form to any reversion of such hostilities by UNK forces. If you were to plan to initiate military action while the Communist forces are complying with the Armistice, my obligation as to both United States forces and other United Nations forces would be to plan how best to prevent their becoming involved and to assure their security.

To turn now to economic matters, we are making plans for the future which will require me to ask for further appropriations from the Congress during the near weeks. When I request these appropriations, I shall surely be asked whether I have confidence that the expenditures will promote a long-term restoration of the Republic of Korea. If I believed that these funds would merely create new targets in a war renewed by you, I could not, consistently with my duty, request Congress to authorize this appropriation.

I am sending you this draft letter to give you an opportunity about pending problems of great concern to think over matters. I must open your reply promptly. However, I cannot, as you see, leave that to assumption and speculation. I must have explicit confirmation from you, in order to reach my own decision and to be able to answer the (S) : (S) question with the Senate and the Congress will properly will follow they make their independent contribution to the complete plan which you and Secretary Acheson and I have been developing.

I have asked the Vice President to hold in his name to you when he calls on you with Ambassador Briggs and General Hall. He has my complete confidence and you can talk to him as you would to me. As you know, he is not only the President but the President of the Senate and a former member of the House and Senate. As such, he will be received by many Senators and Representatives when our Treaty comes before the Senate for ratification and when economic appropriations are sought. He is committed with my eyes on the matters covered in this letter.

You see, if it is convenient to you, I would to be sure reply to this letter. Otherwise, you can deliver it to me through the Ambassador to me.

I intend to you and Mr. Rhee my very best wishes and the assurance of my continuing regard.

Sincerely,

Dwight D. Eisenhower

1. Attached copies of this letter are located in the 795-1017-433 and the Eisenhower Library, Dallas papers, Korean file, box 14-4.  
2. A note on the source text indicated that the enclosed letter was delivered to Rhee by Nixon on Nov. 12, 1953.  
3. The last portion of the attached memorandum was identical to NSC 55174, Nov. 6, 1953, with the exception of paragraph 4 which read as NSC 55174, Nov. 6, 1953. A similar wording in paragraph 4 is found in Nixon, Nov. 6, paragraph 4 was to be deleted and paragraph 4 to become 4, with the rest of the memorandum remaining unchanged. (S) : (S) 701-1017 This change was made per the agreement reached by the Secretaries of Defense and State after the NSC meeting on Nov. 5 (see the memorandum of discussion, 681017-1).

4. A copy of this letter was not attached to the signed letter from Dallas to Nixon in NSC files, 681017-138. The copy came from the 795-1017-433. None of the time as drawn up by Taylor is shown in the 1-8 Eisenhower's signature as located in the Eisenhower Library, Dallas papers, Korean file, box 14-4.

Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Radford) to the Secretary of State,  
 Washington, 17 March 1954  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2, 795B.5/3-1854*

이승만 대통령은 북진통일을 하지 않는다면 한국군 전력을 증강해야 한다는 대안을 제안하였다. 1954년 3월 17일 워싱턴에서 미 합참의장 래드포드가 국무장관에게 보낸 각서에 이승만 대통령의 대안과 그에 대한 래드포드의 의견이 제시되어 있다. 적의 기습 공격 예방을 위해 한국군 20개 사단에 대한 미국의 공군·해군 지원과 군수 지원 제공, 한국군을 35~40개 사단으로 증강, 남한을 비롯한 아시아 동맹국 지상군에 대한 훈련 과업을 밴 플리트 장군에게 부여하는 등의 대안 제안을 통해 이 대통령은 자신이 당면한 문제에 대한 군사·정치적 해결책을 찾기 위해 정직하게 노력하고 있다고 생각되므로 그 제안을 거부하지 말아야 한다는 것이 래드포드의 견해다.

3. 이 대통령의 대안은 “자유 한국과 그 동맹국의 보호”를 목적으로 하는 세 가지다. (Rhee’s alternative proposal has three parts which, as stated by him, are for the purpose of “protection of free Korea and its allies.”)

첫째, 기습적인 적의 돌파를 예방하기 위하여 대한민국 군대의 20개 사단에 대한 적절한 공군·해군·군수 지원을 제공한다. (The first involves adequate air, naval and logistic support for 20 divisions of the ROK army to prevent a surprise enemy break through.) (중략)

둘째, 대한민국 군대를 35~40개 사단으로 증강한다. (The second involves building up the ROK army to a strength of 35~40 divisions.) (중략)

셋째, 남한과 여타 아시아 동맹국 지상군 훈련 과업을 밴 플리트 장군에게 부여한다. (The third involves the assignment of General Van Fleet the task of training the ground forces of South Korea and our other Asian allies.) (중략)

4. 나는 이 대통령이 자신의 문제에 대한 군사·정치적 해결책을 찾기 위하여 정직하게 노력한다고 느끼며, 따라서 그것이 임의로 거부하지 말아야 할 것이다. (I feel that President Rhee is honestly striving to find military and political solutions for his problems, and therefore they should not be arbitrarily rejected.)<sup>45)</sup>

45) Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(Radford) to the



OFFICE OF THE  
HISTORIAN

FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 2

79585/3-1954

**Memorandum by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Radford) to the Secretary of State**

TOP SECRET

Washington, 17 March 1954.

1. Last evening I requested General Hull's comments on President Rhee's letter of 16 March to President Eisenhower.<sup>1</sup> The reply has just been received and is enclosed herewith.<sup>2</sup>

2. While I have not had the opportunity to analyze General Hull's remarks in detail, my initial reaction is that they are sound except in one major matter—that is the extent to and manner in which we reject Rhee's alternative proposal.

3. Rhee's alternative proposal has three parts which, as stated by him, are for the purpose of "protection of free Korea and its allies".

The first involves adequate air, naval and logistic support for 20 divisions of the ROK army to prevent a surprise enemy break through. I believe that Rhee is entitled to such an assurance with the understanding that U.S. Naval and Air Forces will quickly and in strength come to the assistance of ROK if attacked by the Communists.

The second involves building up the ROK army to a strength of 35 to 40 divisions. I agree with Hull that this is beyond prospective capabilities except under conditions prevailing under full mobilization. However, we can well endorse the concept of building up the trained mobilizable reserve in South Korea. This matter will require further study to determine the exact scale which can be underwritten.

The third involves the assignment of General Van Fleet the task of training the ground forces of South Korea and our other Asian allies. This is certainly a matter that can be considered to determine whether the psychological, as well as the practicable, benefits to be attained would merit persuading General Van Fleet to accept such a task.

4. I feel that President Rhee is honestly striving to find military and political solutions for his problems, and therefore they should not be arbitrarily rejected.

AMMAN RADFORD

1. At the direction of Secretary Dulles, Executive Secretary Scott, on Mar. 16 sent to Admiral Radford a copy of telegram 896 from Seoul, Mar. 16, not printed, transmitting the text of Rhee's letter of Mar. 11 to President Eisenhower. Rhee stated that, as agreed upon with Nixon in Seoul in November 1953, he was informing the U.S. Government of his possible intention to take unilateral action to unify Korea. If the United States was unprepared to support a military offensive to take the north, Rhee proposed that the U.S. Government undertake the alternative program as described in this memorandum.

Admiral Radford requested Hull's comments on telegram 896 in telegram JCS 958438 to CINCPAC, Mar. 16, not printed. (JCS files)

2. Reference was to CINCPAC telegram C 67435, printed *infra*, which suggested points to include in the President's reply to Rhee.<sup>22</sup>



Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National Security Council,  
Washington, March 26, 1954

FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2, S/S-NSC files, lot D351, NSC 170 Series

미국 국가안보위원회에서도 한국군의 단독 군사행동 가능성으로 인해 「한미상호방위조약」 비준서 교환이 지연되고 있음이 논의되었다. 1954년 3월 26일 워싱턴에서 운영조정위원회가 국가안보위원회에 제출한 「NSC 170/1(한국에서 미국의 목표와 방책)」 경과 보고서에는 한국군의 단독 군사작전 시행 관련 유엔군사령부와 미국의 대응을 이승만 대통령에게 공식 통보했고, 한국과 미국은 「상호방위조약」을 비준했으며, 비준서의 교환 시 조약의 효력이 발휘되고, 미국은 한국의 지속적인 협조가 보장될 때까지 비준서 교환을 연기한다고 되어 있다. 이 문서의 ‘부록 B’에 의하면, 1954년 3월 6일 이승만 대통령이 아이젠하워 대통령에게 서한을 보내 한국 통일을 위한 독단적 행동을 할 수 있음을 통보했고, 이 서한으로 인해 미 국무장관은 3월 18일로 예정되어 있던 「상호방위조약」 비준서 교환의 연기를 지시하였다.

### I. 요약(Summary)

A. 정책 시행에 따른 조치(Actions in Execution of Policy) (중략)

5. 미국과 대한민국은 상호방위조약을 비준하였다. 이는 언제든지 비준서의 교환으로 발효될 수 있다. 미국은 대한민국의 지속적인 협조가 보장될 때까지 이 조치를 연기한다. (The United States and the Republic of Korea have ratified the Mutual Defense Treaty. It can be brought into effect at any time by an exchange of ratifications. The United States is delaying this action pending further assurance of continued ROK cooperation.)

#### 부록 B(Appendix B)

3월 6일 이 대통령은 아이젠하워 대통령에게 자신이 한국 통일을 위해 독단적 행동을 할 수 있다고 서한으로 통보하였다. (On March 6, President Rhee wrote to President Eisenhower giving notification that he might take unilateral action to unify Korea.) (중략)

이 서한으로 인하여 국무장관은 조약 발효를 위해 3월 18일에 예정된 상호방위조약 비준서의 교환을 연기하라고 지시하였다. As a result of this letter, the Secretary of State directed that the exchange of ratification of the Mutual Defense Treaty which will bring the Treaty into effect and which had been scheduled for March 18, should be postponed.<sup>46)</sup>

46) Progress Report by the Operations Coordinating Board to the National





Hagerty Diary, July 27, 1954, Washington, undated  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, Eisenhower Library, James C. Hagerty Papers

아이젠하워 대통령이 이승만 대통령의 강한 북진통일 신념으로 인해서 양국 정상회담에서 어려움을 겪고 있다는 내용이 기록되어 있다. 1954년 7월 27일 백악관 공보비서관(White House Press Secretary) 해거티(James Campbell Hagerty)가 남긴 기록에 의하면, 아이젠하워 대통령은 한미회담 전에 해거티에게 이승만 대통령과 관련하여 상당한 어려움을 겪고 있다고 말하였다. 이 대통령은 자신의 조국 통일을 원하지만, 그 결과가 너무 끔찍할 것이기에 그가 전쟁을 시작하는 것을 허락할 수 없는 데, 완고한 노인인 그를 언제까지 저지할 수 있을지 모르겠다고 아이젠하워 대통령 자신의 고충을 토로했다는 것이다.

대통령은 이승만으로 인해 상당한 어려움을 겪고 있다고 말하였다. “나는 그 노인에게 미안함을 느낀다. 그는 자신의 조국 통일을 원하지만, 우리는 그것을 위한 전쟁을 시작하도록 허락할 수 없다. 그 결과는 너무 끔찍할 것이다. 그러나 그는 완고한 노인이므로, 우리가 그를 언제까지 저지할 수 있을지 모르겠다.” (The President told me that he was having considerable difficulty with Rhee: "I feel sorry for the old man. He wants to get his country unified, but we cannot permit him to start a war to do it. The consequences would be too awful. But he is a stubborn old fellow, and I don't know whether we'll be able to hold him in line indefinitely.")<sup>47)</sup>

47) Hagerty Diary, July 27, 1954, Washington, undated, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



United States Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of United States Republic of Korea Talks,  
 July 30, 1954, 3 p.m. Washington, [undated]  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 795.00/7-3054

이승만 대통령은 자신의 주장이 관철될 때까지 「한미합의의사록」에 서명하지 않았다. 1954년 7월 30일 오후 3시 워싱턴에서 개최된 제4차 한미회담 기록에 의하면, 이승만 대통령은 7월 31일 워싱턴을 떠나기 전까지 「한미합의의사록」 초안에 서명하지 않았고, 양유찬 대사를 통해 한국에 대한 미국의 경제·군사 지원 프로그램에 대하여 세부적으로 파악할 때까지 서명을 연기하길 원한다고 전언하였다. 이 회담 기록에는 「이승만 대통령과 아이젠하워 대통령, 그리고 그들의 조언자들 사이의 합의의사록」 초안이 첨부되어 있다.

## 2. 합의의사록 초안(Draft Agreed Minute) (중략)

이 대통령은 7월 31일 워싱턴을 떠나기 전까지 초안에 서명하지 않았다. 그날 오후, 이 대통령은 양 대사를 통해 브릭스 대사에게 한국에 대한 미국의 경제·군사 지원 프로그램에 대해 구체적인 세부내용을 파악할 시간이 필요하며 그때까지 자신의 서명을 연기하기 원한다는 말을 전하였다. (President Rhee did not initial the draft before he left Washington on July 31. That afternoon, he sent word to Ambassador Briggs through Ambassador Yang that he needed further time to study the proposed minute and that he preferred to delay his initialing until he knew more specifically the details of what the United States proposes as its economic and military programs for the Republic of Korea.)<sup>48)</sup>

48) United States Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of United States Republic of Korea Talks, July 30, 1954, 3 p.m. Washington, [undated] *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947-1954, KOREA, VOLUME 8, PART 2

United States Summary Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of United States Republic of Korea Talks, July 30, 1954, 3 p. 4

Participants

- The Secretary of State
- Undersecretary Briggs
- Mr. Eisenhower
- Mr. Young
- Mr. MacArthur
- The Secretary of Defense
- Admiral Halliday
- General Hoad
- The Admiral Davis
- General Rogers

- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Stassen
- Mr. Ladd
- Mr. Hopper
- Republic of Korea: Ambassador Yang
- Ambassador Linn
- Admiral Noh Woo-ch
- Park Yu-Chin
- Dr. Choe In-ik
- General Chang B. Bwak
- General Kim Chong-yul
- General Choe Yik-uk

1. Second Status Supervisory Commission

Secretary Dulles referred to the statement made by General Wun Yong Duk warning the Commission members of the NSMC to leave the Republic of Korea. He said that any criticism by the Republic of Korea to leave the Commission members to leave North Korea created problems for us. The United States is trying to bring about an ending of the activities of the NSMC and we are planning to impose restrictions on the teams to the Republic of Korea comparable to those imposed in North Korea.

President Rhee said that three Commission members are meeting secretly in South Korea, using printers and writing as a source of intelligence for the Commission. Meanwhile, the military buildup in North Korea continues despite the armistice. The armistice terms should be declared an end, since the armistice was based on the proposition of the National Conference, which has failed.

General Rogers pointed out the difficulty of verifying compliance between the discussion in South Korea and North Korea, since the Commission has circumvented the point outside the north by means of new rail lines which avoid the area and by failure to make reports.

Secretary Dulles asked if President Rhee would agree not to take further action at the present time while we endeavor to bring an end to the activities of the NSMC through consultation with the North and South. In the meantime, we will try to see to it that the Com and Public members have no luxury facilities and are as far as possible under the same conditions as they are in North Korea.

President Rhee agreed that he would give appropriate instructions to this effect.

2. Draft Agreed Minutes

Most of this session was devoted to a detailed, paragraph by paragraph examination of a draft of an agreed minute which had been prepared by the United States and given to the Koreans the preceding day. President Rhee mentioned only through the discussion of Paragraph 3(a) under the statement of the intentions and policy of the Republic of Korea. Thereafter, the burden of the discussion was carried for the Koreans by Ambassador Yang, Admiral Noh Woo-ch and Mr. Park Yu-Chin. Attached is a copy of this draft minute with deletions from the original United States draft bracketed and with additions to the original United States draft underlined.

At the end of the meeting, there was agreement on the draft with additions and deletions as shown, but the Korean agreement was subject to President Rhee's requirement. President Rhee did not initial the draft before he left Washington on July 31. That afternoon, he sent word to Ambassador Briggs through Ambassador Yang that he would further time to study the proposed minute and that he preferred to delay his initialing until he knew more specifically the details of what the United States proposes as its economic and military programs for the Republic of Korea.

3. Rejection of United States Forces

Admiral Noh said that he could not agree to the reduction to one United States garrison. We could not convince the Korean people that they are safe, and their course will be very badly affected unless the equipment is left behind and four main Korean divisions are created when United States forces are withdrawn.

Secretary Dulles said that we think the forces which remain will be adequate for the defense of Korea.

Admiral Halliday said that we have no prospect of funds to support additional Korean divisions. We believe that the forces which will remain in Korea can contain any proposed Communist aggression. If the Communists attack, we will be fighting a different kind of war.

Dr. Choe said that the Korean people will be greatly worried but if Korean forces are strengthened, that will help. Withdrawal should be accomplished gradually.

Secretary Dulles said that it is necessary to make political preparation for withdrawal, at present, however, the same problem exists all over the world, including the United States. No one expects are developed, not as much movement is needed at the front. We can not afford back to develop new weapons and to maintain the old-fashioned forces.

Ambassador Yang asked for more equipment for the present Korean forces and asked also that the equipment of the United States divisions be left behind when they leave.

Secretary Dulles said that he would be happy to study further the problem of equipment before coming to a final decision. He said that he would be happy to study further the problem of equipment before coming to a final decision. He said that he would be happy to study further the problem of equipment before coming to a final decision.

1. Mutual Defense Treaty  
Ambassador Yang said that the Korean would a mutual defense treaty like the one between the United States and Japan. The Japanese treaty requires no obligations upon the United States. We have no obligation under the treaty to come to the defense of Japan if it is attacked. On the other hand, it gives us perpetual rights to station our forces in Japan. It is a treaty which we made with a defeated enemy before the years' treaty came into effect. The Republic of Korea can have a treaty that will give it the same, but it would be easy to make it.

2. Public Statement  
Ambassador Yang said that he would like to study the question further.

3. Public Statement  
Agreement was reached on a joint public statement to be released from the White House as soon as possible. Attached is the United States draft of this statement, bracketed to show the only change made in it.

Draft Agreed Minute of Conferences Between President Rhee and President Eisenhower and Their Advisers

It is the mutual interests of the United States and the Republic of Korea to continue the close cooperation which has been mutually beneficial and has played a major part in the free world's struggle against communism.

1. Cooperation with the United States Government

1. Cooperate with the United States Government to study Korea. By all appropriate means short of war (including possible offensives through the United Nations) to secure this objective.

2. Maintain Republic of Korea forces under the operational control of the United Nations Command while that Command has responsibility for the defense of the Republic of Korea, unless after consultation it is agreed that we have pulled out of an opportunity to grant to the United Nations Command an withdrawal.

3. Take the necessary measures to make the economic program effective, including: (a) With respect to exchange rates, the 100% rate of the Republic of Korea Government and the insurance rate being the 100% agreement to procedures as proposed by the United States for the conversion of dollars at a different and flexible exchange rate to cover trade balances of United States goods by sales of dollars through the Bank of Korea, and an understanding to allow more flexible exchange and inflation rates of exchange, and generally to revise with goods into the Korean economy a similar rate, thereby providing for the maximum contribution to the Korean economy and to the Korean budget from the use of these resources (it is understood by the United States, that the 100% rate being 100% and be purchased in the form of US dollars).

(b) agreement that a reasonable proportion of the purchases anticipated in the draft program will be purchased primarily in the United States (it is understood that Japan, provided Japan can furnish items of goods of the required quality, may be allowed if that does not in being the objective program the maximum possible percentage of Korea in competitive price).

(c) no arrangements to generate increasing investment projects.

(d) cooperation in procedures for adaptation of United States aid funds consistent with United States legislation and the practical aspects of each program.

(e) arrangements which "are not in conformity" to the agreement between the two governments concerning a common plan for the use of their foreign exchange aid.

(f) a mutual effort to improve their budget and fiscal conditions so with the objective of both governments to manage the budget of the Republic of Korea in a manner that will not work to increase inflation.

4. Normal relations with Japan and to the new future secure relations with it to render the outstanding issues and for that purpose request the United States to designate a mediator for aid in bringing about a just solution.

Based upon the conditions which the Republic of Korea declares it will accept, it is the intentions and policy of the United States to:

1. Continue its program of bringing to strengthen the Republic of Korea politically, economically and militarily;

2. Retain in Korea (if the present) the equivalent of one United States corps with necessary support units, reduction in this to be gradual;

3. In the event of an approved attack upon the Republic of Korea in violation of the armistice, its policy, in accordance with its constitutional provisions, its evolutionary writing power against the aggressor;

4. Support the withdrawal of Korea by all appropriate means short of war;

5. Support a strengthened Republic of Korea military establishment including the development of a reserve system in accordance with arrangements to be worked out by appropriate military representatives of the two governments;

6. Provide some additional direct support to the Republic of Korea military forces in this U.S. fiscal year, the greater amount to be subject of further detailed study and give Republic of Korea-United States cooperation of the Republic of Korea military budget and to be organized in fiscal year 1955 when the United States Congress has acted an appropriations and the United States Government has approved its world-wide commitments.

7. Carry out any necessary Congressional authorizations, consistent to be worked with the economic program for the rehabilitation of Korea.

1. These minutes were drafted by Mr. Dulles.

2. Additions to the draft in the other column are printed as follows:

3. For text of this statement as it was released, see the attachment to the latter's diary, July 31, 1954. The change made was to add the following clause from the last sentence of the third paragraph: "In accordance with the Declaration of the United Nations on Korea on July 10, 1950."

4. All brackets in this attachment are in the margin and indicate deletions from the original U.S. draft; all words printed in italics were additions to the original U.S. draft.



The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command(Hull), Washington, September 15, 1954  
**FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2**, FE files, lot 55D 480, "Korean Black Book, September 1954": Telegram

「한미합의의사록」 체결 과정에서 이승만 대통령이 궁극적으로 원하던 한국군의 전력 증강이 이루어졌다. 1954년 9월 15일 오후 2시 4분 워싱턴의 미국 육군성에서 유엔군 사령관 헐에게 보낸 문서의 '부록 B'에는 1955 회계연도 육군·해군·공군과 해병대를 망라한 한국군의 총병력 수 72만 명과 이에 대한 미국의 지원을 비롯한 구체적인 한국군 증강 계획이 명시되었다.

#### 부록 B(Appendix B)

1955 회계연도 한국군 병력 수준과 그에 대한 미국의 지원(Republic of Korea Force Levels for Fiscal Year 1955 and United States Support Thereof)

1. 미국은 1955 회계연도 동안 다음의 최대 군사력을 유지하도록 지원한다. 육군 66만 1,000명, 해군 1만 5,000명, 해병대 2만 7,500명, 공군 1만 6,500명, 총 72만 명. 만일 한국 정부가 유엔군 사령관과 논의하여 4개 군종 간 소규모 인원의 이동을 원하는 경우, 미국은 최대 72만 명을 초과하지 않는 범위 내에서 그 조정에 동의한다. 총 72만 명은 훈련소에서 훈련 중인 모든 병력과 예비군에서 복무하는 정규군을 포함하는 것이다. (The United States will assist in supporting the following maximum number of military personnel during Fiscal Year 1955: Army 661,000, Navy 15,000, Marine Corps 27,000, Air Force 16,500, Total 720,000. If the Korean Government desires to make minor shifts in numbers as between the four services after discussion with CINCUNC, the United States will agree to such adjustments as long as the maximum of 720,000 is not exceeded. It is understood that the 720,000 total includes all men being trained in training camps and any full-time personnel serving with reserve units.)<sup>49)</sup>

49) The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command(Hull), Washington, September 15, 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1947-1954, NORTH, VOLUME P, PART 1

The Department of the Army to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (MIA)

Reference: 104-10470, (Classification: CONFIDENTIAL) (Page: 1)

TO: The Secretary of Defense (DA 0012), 4000 The Pentagon, Room 3D10, Washington, D.C. 20315

FROM: The Department of the Army (DA 0012), 4000 The Pentagon, Room 3D10, Washington, D.C. 20315

1. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

- 1. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

- 2. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

Appendix A

- 1. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

Appendix B

Table with 2 columns: Item, Amount. Rows include Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Total.

- 1. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

- 3. The Korean Army will continue to build up during Fiscal Year 1954 toward the goal of 75,000 men (current strength)...

Attachment C

1. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

2. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)

- 3. The Department of the Army (DA) is pleased to have received your letter of 10 October 1953, regarding the proposed... (text continues)



The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs) to the Department of State, Seoul, September 27, 1954  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 795B, 5/9-2754: Telegram

이승만 대통령은 미국 대통령이나 고위 관료들과의 협상 과정에서 주도적이었다. 1954년 9월 27일 오후 11시 서울에서 주한 미국대사 브릭스가 미 국무부로 보낸 전보에는 그가 유엔군 사령관 헐과 함께 이승만 대통령을 만나서 나눈 대화의 요지가 기록되어 있다. 이승만 대통령은 자신의 미국 방문이 미국으로부터 추가 지원을 받기 위함이 아니고 한국 통일을 달성하기 위함이며, 평화적 수단으로 한국 통일을 이룬다는 미국의 정책이 실패했기에 자신의 군사적 계획을 제시했다고 주장하였다. 이 대통령은 미군 재배치가 공산주의 위협에 대한 고려나 적절한 준비 없이 진행되었다고 비난하면서 한국은 미국의 지원 여부와 관계없이 자체 진로를 결정해야만 한다고 결론지었다.

1. (중략) 이승만은 자신의 미국 여행 목적이 추가 원조 때문이 아니라 통일 한국을 성취하기 위함이라고 설명하였다. 그는 평화적 수단으로 통일을 달성하겠다는 미국의 정책은 실패했기에 동일 목표를 달성하기 위해 이러한 군사계획을 제공하였다고 말하였다. (중략) 그는 미군 재배치가 공산주의 위협에 대한 적절한 고려 또는 적합한 대비도 없이 이루어졌다고 비난했으며, 이제 한국은 미국의 지원 여부와 관계없이 자체적으로 진로를 결정해야만 한다는 결론을 내렸다. (Rhee launched into explanation purpose his trip to US was not obtain aid but rather achieve unification Korea. He said US policy achieve unification by peaceful means had failed and he had therefore offered present military plan to achieve same objective. (중략) He attacked US redeployment as done without proper consideration Communist threat or adequate preparation and concluded Korea must not determine its own course regardless whether US would assist.)<sup>50)</sup>

50) The Ambassador in Korea(Briggs) to the Department of State, Seoul, September 27, 1954, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



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FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1952-1954, KOREA, VOLUME XV, PART 2

795B.5/9-2754 Telegram

**The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State**

SECRET

Sixth, September 27, 1954—11 p.m.

1950arr362. Repeated information Tokyo 237. Joint message for State, Defense, FOA from Briggs, Hull and Wood. Tokyo also pass CINCUNC and CAG.

General Hull, Wood and I met with President Rhee for two hours this afternoon pursuant Department telegrams 216,<sup>1</sup> 204<sup>2</sup> and 226<sup>3</sup> (repeated Tokyo 627, 610 and 666). Prime Minister Pyun, Defense Minister Sohn and Economic Coordinator Paek also present.

1. Following brief explanatory remarks I presented text draft agreed minute of Washington conversations. Rhee launched into explanation purpose his trip to US was not obtain further aid but rather achieve unification Korea. He said US policy achieve unification by peaceful means had failed and he had therefore offered present military plan to achieve same objective. Seeing there was no interest in this plan he had not presented it, but unified, independent and democratic Korea remained the most important and urgent problem. He attacked US redeployment as done without proper consideration Communist threat or adequate preparation and concluded Korea must now determine its own course regardless whether US would assist.

General Hull and I emphasized sympathy US Government for ROK objective and awareness difficulties confronting her. Hull described purposes behind redeployment stressing that relative strength forces in ROK remains approximately as at time of armistice, thus serving as both assurance to Korea and deterrent to Communists. Rhee's only reply was that he unconvinced our views re Communist threat Korea and time has come for ROK decide its own course and pursue it. He said that no decision made as yet, however. He proposed economic and military aid programs he expressed appreciation for past aid but said that future aid, if given, should be used as ROK sees fit.

Following further discussion these points and our restatement of fact draft minute is requirement for economic and military aid programs of size contemplated, he agreed read and consider minute in that context.

2. Re appointment US mediator to bring about resumption ROK-Japanese negotiations Rhee gave usual harangue on Japanese bad faith and intent to take over Korea again, and he implied US Government has understanding to this effect with Japan. He stated that ROK required as condition resumption of negotiations (1) public cancellation [Page 1884](#) treaty of annexation of Korea, (2) return of books, art treasures and gold reserves, (3) acceptance fishery bans, (4) renunciation property claims. I laid stress on importance Japanese-ROK relations to common objective combatting communism in Asia as well as to welfare and security ROK, pointing out (as did General Hull) that mediator might play constructive role in achieving these objectives. Pyun inserted number of unhelpful comments in this discussion which added up to demand for retraction Kubota statement and public declaration by Japanese Government it would not insist on its property claims and would accept Rhee line. In closing discussion of this item I requested President give further consideration suggestion advanced by US Government for appointment mediator to help resolve these difficulties. He did not altogether reject this but gave no indication whether he would accept on any basis save prior acceptance by Japan of practically all points at issue. This phase of discussion almost completely negative insofar as prospect reasonable approach by ROK.
3. Following discussion these two questions I made strong representations along lines Department telegram 226 re current ROK campaign of abuse and misrepresentations US policy and actions, mentioning specifically statements of high ROK officials, Korean Republic editorials and cartoons and "demonstrations" before US Embassy. I pointed out campaign if continued would have seriously adverse effect on relations our governments and requested it be terminated. Although Pyun sought to argue that Korean press not subject any control by Government, President appeared impressed by seriousness of US Government concern and specifically stated he would see that demonstrators cease disturbing Embassy in future.

In sum Rhee agreed consider draft minute further, gave no commitment whatever re proposed US mediator in ROK-Japanese situation (but did not flatly reject idea) and appeared impressed at genuineness our concern re anti-US campaign. He reiterated several times that Korea was now in "a perilous situation" and gave impression being both depressed and uncertain as to where he would turn, suggesting that unification under Communists is perhaps better than no unification at all. This statement was made rather feebly, however, and with no real show of conviction.

Bebes

<sup>1</sup> *Supra* [c.](#)

<sup>2</sup> Dated Sept. 18, [p. 1882](#) [c.](#)

<sup>3</sup> Not printed. (795B.5/9-2154) [c.](#)

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, October 26, 1954-7:25 p.m.  
*FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*, 795B. 00/10-2654: Telegram


미국도 「한미합의의사록」 체결 과정에서 자국의 실리를 양보하지 않았다. 1954년 10월 26일 오후 7시 25분 워싱턴 미 국무부가 주한 미국 대사에게 보낸 전보에 한국 측 합의록 개정 초안 관련 미국 입장을 이승만 대통령에게 전달하라는 내용이 다음과 같이 기록되어 있다. 한국 측 초안의 주요 수정사항은 미국의 합의사항은 늘어나고 한국의 합의사항은 줄어드는 방향이므로 미국은 이를 받아들일 수 없다. 이 문제에 관한 미국 입장은 이 대통령의 방미 기간에 충분히 설명하였다. 아이젠하워 대통령과 덜레스 장관의 성명을 통해 미국이 무력통일을 지지한다는 내용을 합의사항으로 받아들일 수 없음을 한국은 이미 알고 있을 것이다. 미국은 한국과 미국 측 초안을 논의할 의향이 있지만, 한국이 미국 측 초안에 동의하지 않는다면 한국에 대한 경제·군사 지원을 제공하지 않을 것이다. 한국이 원하는 내용을 재고하고 미국 측 초안에 동의해서 한국에 대한 미국의 경제·군사 원조 프로그램이 잘 진행되길 희망하고 있다.

(중략) 한국 측 초안의 주요 수정사항은 미국의 합의사항은 늘어나고 한국의 합의사항은 줄어드는 방향이므로 미국은 이를 받아들일 수 없다. 이 문제에 관한 미국 입장은 이 대통령의 방미 중에 충분히 설명하였다. 한국은 아이젠하워 대통령과 덜레스 장관의 성명을 통해 미국이 무력통일을 지지한다는 합의사항을 받아들일 수 없음을 알고 있을 것이다. 미국은 미국 측 합의록 초안을 한국과 논의할 의향이 있으나, 미국 측 초안과 그 부록에 대한 한국의 수락이 없으면 경제·군사 지원을 하지 않겠다는 실질적 요점에 대한 미국 입장은 확고하다. 미국은 한국이 그 입장을 재고하고 경제 및 군사 원조 프로그램이 진행될 수 있도록 미국 측 초안에 동의하길 희망한다. (Major changes in ROK draft Minute are in direction of increasing US commitments and decreasing ROK commitments and are unacceptable US. US position these matters has been explained fully during and subsequent visit to US of President Rhee. Re unification, ROK knows from statements President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles that US cannot accept

undertaking to support unification by force. While willing discuss US draft Minute with ROK, US position on substantive points firm and US not committed to economic and military aid undertakings without ROK acceptance undertakings contained US draft Minute and appendices. US hopes ROK will reconsider its position and agree to US draft Minute substantially in present form so that economic and military aid program can go forward.)<sup>51)</sup>



51) The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea, Washington, October 26, 1954-7:25 p.m, *FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2*.



전쟁사와 국방정책 2024-II

# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정



#### IV. 맺음말





## IV. 맺음말

「한미상호방위조약」은 1953년 10월 1일 워싱턴에서 변영태 외무장관과 덜레스(John Foster Dulles) 미 국무장관이 공식적으로 조인하였다. 1954년 1월 15일 대한민국 국회, 1월 26일 미 상원이 「한미상호방위조약」을 각각 비준하였다. 하지만 그로부터 10개월 후인 11월 17일(한국 11월 18일) 워싱턴에서 양유찬 주한 미국대사와 덜레스 미 국무장관이 「한미상호방위조약」 비준서를 교환함으로써 조약이 정식으로 발효되었다. 비준서 교환식은 11월 17일 오후 4시 서울에서 이승만 대통령의 입회 아래 변영태 외무장관과 브릭스 주한 미국대사가 「한미합의의사록」을 체결한 이후에야 비로소 이루어졌다. 한미동맹의 근간이 되는 「한미상호방위조약」은 조인 이후에 그 법적 효력이 발생할 때까지 1년 이상의 시간이 소요되었다.

그 이유는 1953년 10월 1일 조약을 체결한 이후에 중요한 현안에 대한 양국 정상의 이견 조율이 필요했기 때문이다. 미국은 휴전(정전)을 전쟁의 종식 행위로 간주했지만, 이승만 대통령은 휴전을 전쟁 행위의 일시적 중단으로 인식하였다. 이 대통령은 정전 후에도 북진통일을 주장하면서 한미군사동맹 체제의 강화를 위해 노력했고, 그는 상호방위조약만으로는 한국의 안전보장이 부족하다고 판단했기에 국군의 전력 강화와 현대화, 대한(對韓) 경제 원조의 일본 전용(轉用) 방지를 미국 정부에 요구하기도 하였다.

한미동맹의 성립과정에서 발생한 주요 사건들을 인터넷 공개 미국 국무부 사료인 *Foreign Relations of United States, 1952-1954, Korea, Volume XV*에서 찾아보았다. 대한민국 대통령 기록관과 외무부에도 관련 사료가 있지만, 소모적 논쟁을 피하고 출처의 객관성을 담보하기 위해 미국 자료만 활용하였다.

정전협상이 진행되면서 「정전협정」과 「한미상호방위조약」의 조인에 이르기까지 이승만 대통령은 정전(Armistice) 반대와 북진통일을 계속

해서 주창하였다. 아이젠하워 대통령을 비롯한 미국 관료들은 유엔의 결정대로 한반도에서의 정전을 추구하고, 미 군부에서는 이에 걸림돌이 되는 이승만 대통령을 압박하기 위한 「에버레디계획」을 수립하기도 하였다.


「정전협정」이 체결되고 「한미상호방위조약」이 조인된 이후 이승만 대통령은 한반도 평화를 위한 제네바 정치회담은 실패할 것이므로 군사력으로 공산주의자들을 한반도에서 완전히 축출해야만 한다고 주장하였다. 미국이 지원하지 않는다면 한국군 단독으로라도 북진해서 공산주의자들을 몰아내고 통일 한국을 이룩하겠다는 의도였다. 이로 인해 미국은 「한미상호방위조약」의 법적 발효 조건인 한미 양국 국회의 비준서 교환을 연기해 가면서, 한국군의 단독 북진을 막기 위해 유엔군사령부가 한국군을 작전 통제하여 정전협정 준수 의무를 부과하는 「한미합의사록」 초안을 작성하였다. 「한미합의사록」을 체결하기 위한 양국 정부의 협의 과정에서 이승만 대통령은 북진 무력통일을 주창해 온 그의 입장을 철회하는 대가로 국군 10개 예비 사단 신설, 해군·공군력 증강을 포함하여 한국에 대한 미국의 군사·경제 원조 확대의 성과를 거두었다. 이로써 한국군은 1955 회계연도 기준으로 육군 66만 1,000명, 해군 1만 5,000명, 해병대 2만 7,500명, 공군 1만 6,500명으로 구성된 총 72만 명의 국군을 유지하게 되었다.

이승만 대통령은 「한미상호방위조약」과 「한미합의사록」의 체결로 성립된 한미동맹으로 한국의 생존과 안보를 미국으로부터 보장받는 데 성공하였다. 미국은 「한미상호방위조약」으로 공산주의자들의 남침 재개를 막고, 「한미합의사록」으로 한국의 북진통일을 통제함으로써 정전체제에서 한반도 평화를 통한 자국의 이익을 도모할 수 있었다.

국방 분야의 한미동맹 관련 연구자와 정책입안자들이 이 책을 읽고 70년 전 선각자들의 흔적을 통해 관련 분야 연구와 정책 수립을 위한 통찰력을 얻게 되길 바란다. 이 책은 군사 분야에 치중해서 저술함으로 인해 경제 분야에 관한 내용을 다루지 못한 아쉬움이 있다. 「한국에 대한 군사 및 경제 원조에 관한 대한민국과 미합중국 간의 합의의

사록(한미합의의사록)의 체결은 ‘한강의 기적’이라 불리는 급격한 경제 성장을 이룩한 한국이 미국으로부터 상당한 경제 원조를 받을 수 있는 계기가 되었다. 이 분야의 후속 연구를 통해 그 미진함이 보완되길 기대하며 글을 맺는다.





전쟁사와 국방정책 2024-II

# 미국 사료로 본 한미동맹 성립과정



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
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## 설 문 지

안녕하십니까?

국방부 군사편찬연구소는 국방역사, 전쟁사, 군사사(軍事史) 관련 연구를 수행하는 국내 유일의 국방부 직할 군사(軍史) 연구기관으로 국방역사에 관한 단행본과 정책 연구서를 발간해 왔습니다.

이 책은 2023년 12월에 발간한 『한미동맹 70년사』에서 상세히 다루지 못한 한미동맹 성립과정의 미국 사료 해제를 실었습니다. 이 책이 한미동맹 연구 또는 관련 업무를 수행하는 독자에게 객관적인 시각으로 역사를 조망하는 인식의 창을 제공할 것으로 기대합니다.

이 책을 읽은 소감이나 의견을 보내주시면 향후 연구편찬 업무에 반영하여 국방정책 수립에 보탬이 되는 국방역사서 발간에 최선의 노력을 기울이겠습니다.

\* 작성하신 설문서는 FAX 또는 우편, E-mail로 보내주시면 감사하겠습니다.

국방부 군사편찬연구소장 오 성 대

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		매우 만족	만 족	보 통	불 만족	매우 불 만족
1	연구자료로서의 역사성과 완성도가 높은 산물인가?					
2	책의 구성과 내용은 논리적·사실적·객관적인가?					
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보완/제안 사항						

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


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


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